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By
Cristina Nistor
Submitted to the Sloan School of Management
on June 4, 2012 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Management
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on product quality and pricing.
Essay 1: Pricing and Quality Provision in a Channel: A Model of Efficient Relational
Contracts
The first essay analyzes how quality concerns affect relationships in a channel. A finn concerned
about uncontractible quality for a customizable good has to pay higher prices to sustain a
relationship with the supplier. If the customizable good has very volatile demand, premium
payments on this good cannot be sustained. Instead, the downstream firm pays a premium for a
good with more stable demand that is correlated with demand for the customizable good. I use a
novel dataset containing sales made by a wholesaler to Asian restaurants in the Southeastern
United States to test this prediction empirically. As predicted by the proposed model, if
customizable goods have very volatile demand, the high end restaurants do not pay a premium
on those goods but instead pay a premium for other goods with more stable demand.
Essay 2: Third Party Marketing Approvals
The second essay measures the effect of competition in a certifier market. When customers
purchase new products, there is often a degree of uncertainty about their quality. A common
solution is to rely on a third-party certifier to provide some form of accreditation that signals
quality. However, the incentives of a third-party certifier may not be completely benign.
Competitive certification markets may lead the certifiers to provide unduly positive evaluations
of quality to gain market share or provide unduly negative evaluations in order to gain credibility
with end-users. This paper exploits an unusual natural experiment to evaluate the extent to which
third-parties can be relied upon to correctly report product quality. It focuses on the FDA's
decision to allow third parties to prepare certifications for certain medical devices, and observes
how this decision to introduce competition at the reviewer stage has affected the quality of
products allowed to go to market. There is evidence that allowing third party certification leads
to significantly lower product quality. However, experience with using a third party reviewer in
the past diminishes the negative effect of reviewer competition.
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Essay 3: Layaway and the Quasi-Endowment Effect of Installment Payments
The third essay explores the quasi-endowment effect. The paper evaluates how much consumers
are willing to prepay for a purchase which will be experienced in the future. In particular, the
results indicate that prepaid installment plans allow the consumer to start deriving utility for the
purchase from the moment of the first payment. This quasi-endowment effect is felt only for
goods that are purchased for own consumption.
Thesis Committee:
Catherine Tucker (Chair), Douglas Drane Career Development Professor in IT and
Management, Associate Professor of Marketing
Drazen Prelec, Digital Equipment Corp. Leaders for Global Operations Professor of
Management
Birger Wernerfelt, J. C. Penney Professor of Management




I am grateful for the many people who supported my time as a student at MIT Sloan.
I am thankful that my advisor, Catherine Tucker allowed me to find my own research path while
devoting great care and thought to my academic attempts. I learned to identify good ideas and
great datasets while working with her and I have been happy to benefit from her overall advice
about publishing and research. I am also grateful for my committee members, Drazen Prelec,
Birger Wernerfelt and Juanjuan Zhang, for working with me over the years and spending a great
deal of time caring about my education. My thanks also go to all other members of the MIT
faculty, who provided examples and feedback on my work: Sharmila Chatterjee, Duncan
Simester, Joshua Ackerman, Michael Braun, Renee Gosline, John Hauser, John Little, Glen
Urban.
My thanks go to Sharon Cayley and Hillary Ross for helping me disentangle the academic
requirements of the program.
I thank Mami and Adrian for their love and support, and for always believing that I could and
should do the best research that I also enjoy.
I also thank my extended family Ngoc, Le and Hannah and Sarah, Brandon, Audrey, Ryden and
Evan for being the steady point in my changing life.
Most of all, I am grateful for my husband's support and love. Matt's presence has made me want
to be a better researcher and person.
6
Essay 1:
Pricing and Quality Provision in a Channel:
A Model of Efficient Relational Contracts*
Abstract
I model how quality concerns affect relationships in a channel. A firm concerned
about uncontractible quality for a customizable good has to pay higher prices to sustain
a relationship with the supplier. If the customizable good has very volatile demand,
premium payments on this good cannot be sustained. Instead, the downstream firm
pays a premium for a good with more stable demand that is correlated with demand for
the customizable good. I use a novel dataset containing sales made by a wholesaler to
Asian restaurants in the Southeastern United States to test this prediction empirically.
As predicted by the proposed model, if customizable goods have very volatile demand,
the high end restaurants do not pay a premium on those goods but instead pay a
premium for other goods with more stable demand.
*I am indebted to Catherine Tucker and Birger Wernerfelt, for guidance and encouragement. I also thank
the restaurant supply company that provided the data for this study. Helpful comments were provided by
Sharmila Chatterjee, Bob Gibbons, Drazen Prelec, Matthew Selove, Duncan Simester, Juanjuan Zhang; and
also by attendants at the 2012 AMA conference and seminar participants at Berkeley, Chapman, Chicago,
Emory, Georgia Tech, MIT, Toronto, and UNC.
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1 Introduction
"You would expect that the customer pays us high prices for the value-added services we
provide. Well, that doesn't happen. [...] We cross-sell our other products to these customers
by offering them significant breaks on the value-add products in return for their commitment
to buy the book-and-ship products exclusively from us. In a way, in these relationships the
commodity products subsidize the specialty products."
-Stephen Kaufman, Arrow Electronics Inc. CE01
Suppliers and downstream partners face choices over wholesale prices every time they
interact in a channel decision. I look at how these choices are affected by different needs
for uncontractible quality of the goods provided. My analysis is in the context of repeated
interactions, which give firms the opportunity to sustain a level of effort from the supplier that
would not be possible in a one-time interaction. I develop a model that shows how channel
members can use "relational contracts" (Baker et al. 2002) to provide uncontractible services
to the downstream players who value them.
The model is a repeated game played by a supplier and a downstream firm. Both players
have the same information about demand, costs and characteristics of the downstream firm.
In addition to the physical good, the supplier can add a dimension of quality (such as product
customization) that is not contractible through a formal contract.' I show that downstream
players who care about the uncontractible product customization will pay higher wholesale
prices than those who do not. They are willing to pay a premium price as a payment to
reward the supplier's effort and sustain the relationship.
If some goods are customizable and some are not, we might expect that the most efficient
relationship would set a price premium on the customizable goods to provide stronger effort
'Quoted in HBS Case "Arrow Electronics, Inc." (Narayandas 1998)
2These services may be uncontractible because they are not yet known at the time the contract is written,
or because it would be too difficult to specify, monitor or enforce them.
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incentives to the supplier in times of high demand. However, I show that if demand for the
customizable goods is very volatile, this creates a problem. When demand is very high, the
premium payment required by the supplier may be so high that it exceeds the value of the
relationship to the retailer. This could cause the retailer to violate the relational contract
by refusing to pay these high premium payments.
Firms face a dilemma between wanting to provide stronger effort incentives to the supplier
in times of high demand and, on the other hand, not wanting to require unrealistically
high premium payments from the retailer in times of high demand. I show that in some
cases, setting a price premium on non-customizable goods can help resolve this dilemma. If
demand for different types of goods is correlated, but demand for non-customizable goods
is less volatile, then a price premium on non-customizable goods can serve the dual role of
providing the supplier with stronger incentives in times of high demand while still limiting
the "spikes" in these payments to a range that is acceptable to the retailer.
Thus, the model has surprising insights about which types of payments can sustain
optimal effort in a relational contract. I show that a price premium on a non-customized
good is sometimes the most efficient way to reward a supplier for effort on a customizable
good. Alternative payment schemes would result in the relationship breaking down or in
less-than-optimal effort.
I test the model on a large novel dataset from a supplier of sushi restaurants from the
Southeast region of the United States. I supplement the data with menu prices for each
restaurant and use these as a proxy for the restaurant's type as a downstream player.
The results are consistent with the predictions of the model: the supplier customizes
raw products to various degrees if the restaurant requests it. Restaurants that require
customization pay a premium on non-customized products such a rice.3 This is consistent
3The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discriminations between purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality which are likely to result in substantial injury to competition. However, it is not applicable
in the case of goods that are improved through the service provided by the manufacturer. In effect, a
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with the model, as products like fresh fish have volatile demands that are quickly affected
by supply shocks or other non-demand related shocks, so any payment scheme linked to the
actual product being customized would not be able to sustain the relational contract that
provides the customization effort. On the other hand, dry products like rice are relatively
stable goods that are perfect for serving as a basis for the premium payment to sustain the
relational contract.
My results are consistent with the intuition of managers in the industry. In an interview
with the manager for the supply company, he says the main goal for the sales force is to
make the high-end restaurants happy with the relationship. In terms of wholesale prices,
the supplier believes that high-end restaurants do not care about prices as long as they get
a consistent quality of goods and all their service demands are satisfied. On the other hand,
the manager is aware that none of the low end restaurants will want to pay for extra services
and that they will switch suppliers as soon as they find a vendor with lower prices.
Conversations with a manager from a value-oriented restaurant' revealed that this type
of downstream player is mainly concerned with obtaining low prices for an adequate quality
of the actual good. The manager decided to use several suppliers by comparing prices for
each good and choosing to purchase the lowest price good from each supplier. Even after
a few years of operation, the restaurant still uses several suppliers and buys certain goods
from each of them. 5
customized good has added service that does warrant a different price from different restaurants. Most
importantly, there is no intention of competitor harm (Luchs et al. 2010) in the bargaining over prices and
quality of the products delivered.
4 Personal interview with a manager of a small family owned and operated sushi restaurant in a large city
in Latin America. The restaurant is aimed at middle income college students and workweek lunch crowd.
They believe their main competitors are fast-food restaurants priced around 4$ to 5$ because their menu
has bundled prices of 5$ to 7$.
5The manager I interviewed acknowledged that he sometimes calls the sales agent to complain about
wholesale prices if the price increase is unexpected (5% or 7% instead of 2%). Moreover, he claims that the
supplier will sometimes substitute products if an item becomes unavailable and the restaurant is faced with
the difficult choice of returning the products and not having enough material to work with or just keeping
the inadequate products. He speculates that the situation arises because suppliers are sometimes hit with
limited supply of an item, and they keep the small quantities for their 'bigger' customers. I would argue
that this explanation is indeed very plausible, and that it is likely the supplier is making sure their 'best'
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This paper analyzes a theoretical model of relational contracts with a specific empirical
application to the restaurant industry. However, the problem is more general: relational
contracts are used in any channel where suppliers and downstream firms face a problem of
uncontractible effort, costly monitoring of product quality, or a classic problem of channel
coordination without a way to write enforceable contracts.
Arrow Electronics is another example of a company that uses a pricing structure like
the one modeled in this paper to sustain a relationship with its customers. The company
is a distributor for two types of micro-chips: standard commodity chips and "value-added"
chips they customize for each client. The latter type of products requires effort investment
from Arrow. As mentioned by the company's CEO, the company does not charge a price
premium for value-added products they customize for each client's specific needs. Instead,
the company prices these value-added chips competitively and uses them to attract and
retain customers who then pay higher margins on the standard chips.
A third example of a supplier that uses this type of pricing structure is a healthcare
consultant who prepares patient satisfaction reports for hospitals in a large city in the South-
western United States. 6 The clients are hospitals who have ongoing contracts for five years
that can be terminated with one month notice. The clients sometimes have requests that
are not written in the initial contract because it is difficult to know ahead of time what
will be needed. They ask for added services, such as individual reports, results by area of
management, or reports broken out by any variable in the data. The consultant generally
does not charge for these extra projects, which he usually accepts, even though they are
effort intensive. Instead, the price of the standard contract is set higher to make up for these
added requests. If the added project is too big, then a one-time invoice will be sent to the
client, but the price will still be lower than what it would be if the client were to pay regular
customers are getting the needed inputs.
6 This example is based on a personal interview with the consultant.
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prices (for example, a large extra project that would usually require a $30, 000 budget if
done for a different customer will actually be billed as a $8,000 project). The practice of
having a price premium on the standard contracts and then offering extra services for free
or lower prices is meant to sustain a relationship with the clients and encourage them not
to price shop for each service individually, but rather think of all transactions as part of a
relationship with the consultancy.
In Section 2 I review related literature. Section 3 introduces the theoretical model. The
data are presented in Section 4, with the empirical analysis following in Section 5. Section
6 concludes with implications for channel management and directions for future research.
2 Related Literature
Bargaining as a mechanism of setting wholesale prices has been analyzed in Iyer and Villas-
Boas (2003). This paper extends the results by allowing infinitely repeated interactions that
make relational contracts possible. Additionally, Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003) show that two-
part tarrifs are not useful in a bargaining setting. Ho and Zhang (2008) also find that two
part tarrifs are not successful in coordinating a channel. They verify empirically that framing
may improve efficiency of using two-part tarrifs. This paper is consistent with their findings:
I establish that two-part tarrifs are too inflexible to sustain efficient relational contracts and
be used in a channel where wholesale prices are set through a repeated bargaining process.
Recent theoretical models and empirical work show manufacturer's response to a strategic
retailer (Bayus and Putsis 1999; Geylani et al. 2007; Dukes et al. 2009). In a related context, I
show that there are strategic reasons for the non-dominant retailer to assume low-bargaining
power over wholesale prices in order to maintain a relationship with the manufacturer. Under
certain conditions, the relationship with the manufacturer is a relational contract that ensures
optimal quality provision in the channel. Additionally, the current paper identifies reasons
for the weak retailer's inability to dictate low wholesale prices.
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A related stream of literature deals with information that can affect profits of channel
partners. This information could be about the costs faced by the retailer, or a signal about
product quality geared toward end consumers, or information about manufacturing costs
or even strategic information sharing in a channel (Jeuland and Shugan 1983; Desiraju and
Moorthy 1997; Shaffer and Zettelmeyer 2002; Corbett et al. 2004; Liu and Zhang 2006; Guo
and Iyer 2010). Information asymmetry in bargaining is documented in Busse et al. (2006).
This paper assumes that all parties in the channel have the same information about demand,
costs and each other's types.
Most empirical studies of channel relations to date have focused on how differences
in market power of various brands or manufacturers affect the proportion of promotional
passthrough (Besanko et al. 2003; Nijs et al. 2009) or have investigated the competitive
structure of a channel (Kadiyali et al. 2000; Sudhir 2001; Villas-Boas and Zhao 2005; Dra-
ganska et al. 2010). This paper looks for the reasons leading to different market power levels
of retailers in a channel and estimates the resulting differences in prices they pay to the
upstream supplier.
This paper is related to a stream of literature that studies relationships in a channel or
in business-to-business environments and identifies characteristics of how such relationships
may influence transactions (Spekman et al. 1998; Jap 1999; Cannon and Perreault 1999;
Ghosh et al. 2006; Shervani et al. 2007; Tuli et al. 2007, 2010; Rietz et al. 2011). Additionally,
this literature stream has analyzed how the use of punishment strategies and channel conflict
can sustain close ties (Kumar et al. 1995, 1998). The present paper contributes to this
literature by formulating a theoretical model of repeated interactions that provides insights
into the mechanism behind prices and quality in channel relationships.
This paper uses an infinitely repeated game in the style of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986);
Abreu (1988); Lal (1990); Dechenaux and Kovenock (2007); Thomadsen and Bhardwaj
(2011). Like these earlier papers, I derive conditions in which repeated interactions enable
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firms to cooperate in equilibrium. By applying this framework to the problem of pricing
and quality provision in a channel with multiple products, I generate new insights about the
optimal pricing tactics that make cooperation sustainable. This leads to the surprising result
that in some cases more efficient cooperative outcomes are possible when the downstream
firm pays a premium on goods that are not being customized, instead of on the more volatile
customized goods.
An area often neglected in marketing is that of relational contracts that develop in a
channel. There is a growing economic literature on contracts and relational contracts in
particular (e.g Baker et al. 2002; Levin 2003; Brown et al. 2004; Gibbons 2005; Plambeck and
Taylor 2006; Halac 2011). This paper brings to light the importance of relational contracts
in marketing channels. It explains how downstream players may end up with different levels
of market power in a channel by allowing the use of relational contracts between retailers
and suppliers. This paper also compares different payment schemes that allow efficient
relationships to provide optimal effort. The results are consistent with Levin (2003), who
finds in a different context, that the discretionary payments to sustain the relationship
cannot be too large to prevent the principal from walking away, or too low to prevent the
agent from walking away. I extend these results to study pricing mechanisms that make
relational contracts sustainable in a channel. One important difference is that I explicitly
model channels in which the supplier sells multiple goods and study which types of goods
are suitable for the price premiums that sustain relational contracts.
3 Theoretical Model
I build a model with two risk-neutral players: a manufacturer and a retailer. The upstream
firm can sell two goods to the downstream player. The value of good one can be increased if
the seller invests (non-contractible) effort into customizing it for the retailer. Good two is a
basic good, which cannot be customized. The players trade repeatedly at dates t = 0, 1, 2....
14
For simplicity, let good one, which has an uncontractible quality dimension, be denoted by
subscript u while the basic good, good two is denoted by b.
On-time delivery, consistent good customer service, personal help and even customized
improvements to the physical good are possible examples of quality dimensions that may be
uncontractible or unknown (such as in Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003)) at the time the bargaining
process over prices takes place. The model allows for these uncontractible quality dimensions
to be quite general: it suffices that a formal contract may be hard to enforce, or hard to
specify or costly to monitor in order for the results to be valid.
The firms find it impossible to write completely enforceable contracts because of the
complexity of the transactions, but their desire to continue to do business with each other in
the future acts as an incentive to maintain a relational contract. Under certain conditions,
this relationship is self-enforcing and leads to optimal quality for the buyer because both
parties fear the loss of future benefits if they deviate from cooperating.
I do not explicitly model consumer demand, but I assume the retailer needs quantities qt,,
and qt,b of goods one and two, respectively, in period t. These amounts can vary randomly
from period to period, and I allow for qt,u and qtb to be correlated.
The downstream firm's utility at time t is given by UR, = qt,(a1±-et-P,,)-qt,bY(a2-Pt,b)
with et the non-contractible effort per unit put in by the seller at time t. Pt,, and Pt,b are
the unit prices at time t, and ci and a2 are constants.
The seller's utility is given by Us, = qi,,(Pt,, - c(e,)) + qt,b(Pt,b) with c(e) being the per-
unit cost of effort, which I will assume for simplicity is of the form c(e) = #e 2 . Without loss
of generality, set marginal cost equal to zero.
The retailer wants to maximize 6%, &UR, while the supplier wants to maximize E 00 Us.
Note that optimal effort for maximizing total channel profits is given by e* = . This
is the optimal per unit effort which implies that optimal investment costs for the seller are
higher when quantity qt,u is high.
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The supplier has the outside option to sell the goods at unit prices PU and Pb. The
outside option does not reward the supplier for the effort expended on customization. For
example, the outside option may be a low end retailer who does not value quality or it could
be that the effort is specific to the retailer who requests it.
3.1 Timing
The parties initially agree on a relational contract (Pu, P, e(q)) with constant unit prices
for each good and effort which can be a function of quantity. The restriction to constant
unit prices can be justified on the grounds of simplicity (Schmalensee 1989). However, it is
important to allow per-unit effort to vary with quantity because in some cases the optimal
effort cannot be sustained if quantity is very large.
At each time t, the game has 3 stages:
1. Nature draws qt,, and qt,b and the buyer and the seller observe this demand for that
particular period.
2. The seller decides how much effort to put into providing the service, et. The buyer
observes this choice.
3. The buyer can either agree to pay the unit prices from the relational contract P' and
P or can deviate and go to the outside market, which offers Pu and Pb.
3.2 Results
There is always a bad equilibrium where the supplier invests zero effort and the retailer offers
(A, Pb). Assume that if the relationship breaks down then the players revert to this bad
equilibrium.
For the relational contract to be sustainable there can never be a time when either firm is
better off deviating than staying in the relationship. I derive conditions for both the supplier
and the retailer to stay in the relationship.
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At any time t the utility for the buyer if it stays in the relationship is given by its utility
in the present period added to the discounted stream of utilities it gets in the future while
it is in the relationship:
00
qtu[a1+et (qt,)-Pu|+qtb[a2-Pb]+ 6-t{ E[q,,,(a 1 + eT(qT,u) - Pu)] + E[qT,b(a2 - Pb)]}-
T=t+1
(1)
Note that I allow effort eT to be a function of quantity qT,u as specified in the relational
contract mentioned before.
On the other hand, if the retailer deviates and offers lower prices, the relationship will
end. In this case, the prices in this period and all future periods will be Pu and Pb, and
effort will be zero in all future periods. Thus, the retailer's utility if it deviates at any time
t is given by:
00
qt,[a 1 +et(qtu) - Pu] + qt,b[a2 - Pb] + S -t{E[qTu(a 1 - Pu)] + E[qT,b(Ca2 - Pb)]}. (2)
T=t+1
Note that given the assumptions about timing of the model, the supplier has already
invested a sunk effort at time t, so effort is not affected until the next period t + 1.
Comparing the conditions (1) and (2) and rearranging terms gives the boundary under
which the retailer will always want to stay in the relationship:
(Pu - Pu) qt,u + E[q',I] ± (Pb - P b) qb ± E[qT,bI] < 1 E[qeJ (3)1 61-56 1-6
Intuitively, the present value of all the premium payments the retailer makes must be
less than the present value of the benefits it receives due to the supplier's higher effort in
order for the relationship to be sustainable.
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The utility for the supplier if it stays in the relationship at any time t is:
qt,u - /3[et (qt,u)]2] + qt,b[P + E 6/-E [qT,uPu + grbP3 - Tup[e(q,u)]2 (4)
T=t+1
On the other hand, if the supplier deviates and provides lower effort than specified in the
relational contract, the retailer will only agree to pay PU and P (the supplier's reservation
prices) in the current periods and in all future periods as well. Thus, at any time t, the
supplier's utility if it deviates and provides zero effort is:
qta[Pu| + qt,b[Pb ] + 6-E[qPu + qT,sPb]. (5)
T=t+1
By comparing conditions (4) and (5) for the supplier and rearranging terms, the supplier
will always want to stay in the relationship only if at each time t:
(Pu~ -Z) [qt,u + 1 E[qT,uI] + (Pb- Pb) [qt,b + E[qT,b]] >(P1-6PU 1-6
> q/,u[et(qt,u )]2 + 6 OE [qT,u[eT(qT,u)12 (6)
Intuitively, the present value of the premium payments the supplier receives in this period
and all future periods must be greater than the present value of its cost of effort in order for
the supplier to stay in the relationship.
I first study the case in which optimal effort is always sustainable. In this case, I prove
that it is always possible to create an efficient relational contract that sets a price premium
only on the good with uncontractible quality. However, if demand for the good with un-
contractible quality is very volatile, it is not possible to sustain the optimal effort in all
periods. In this case, I derive conditions in which a contract that places a premium on
the non-customizable good leads to a more efficient outcome than a contract that places a
premium on the customizable product.
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By combining the constraints for the supplier and the retailer, a necessary condition for
a contract to be sustainable is that:
r 6 /'i] 6
/3qtu[et(q,,) ] 2 + E[qTeT (qT) E[qTeT(qT)]. (7)
Intuitively, the present value of the cost of effort (to the supplier) in the current and all
future periods must be less than the present value of the benefit of effort (to the retailer) in
all future periods.
If I substitute in the expression for optimal effort e* = g, condition (7) becomes:
0 gt,u + 1 6E[ E [qT,ul.
Rearranging terms and simplifying gives:
qt,u < 1 E[qu
The relationship is always sustainable (for all possible qT,u) only if:
max(qt,u) < 6 6) E[qT,u] (8)
This condition states that optimal effort can only be sustained if the maximum quantity
is small enough relative to the expected quantity, and if firms place enough weight on the
future. Intuitively, the expected value of the relationship must be large enough to compensate
for the effort required in times of greatest demand.
Proposition 1. If it is possible to sustain optimal effort for all levels of demand (inequality
(8) holds) then there is an efficient relational contract that sets a premium only on the good
with uncontractible quality (P > PU, Pb = P).
19
Proof: Set e(q) = e*= and set P-P, = ( The supplier's constraint (6) always
holds with equality. The assumption that condition (8) holds (and therefore (7) holds as
well) implies that the retailer's constraint (3) always holds as well. QED
Intuitively, in cases where optimal effort is sustainable, a premium on the good with
uncontractible quality can be used to exactly offset the supplier's cost of effort in each
period. The retailer is always willing to make this premium payment if condition (8) holds.
The next step in the analysis is to identify an arrangement that gives both the seller and
the buyer the appropriate incentives to sustain an efficient relational contract when optimal
effort (first best) is not sustainable.
I will now derive conditions that guarantee a more efficient contract is possible when
premium payments are made on the non-customizable good instead of the customizable
good. As an example, to provide intuition for how this can happen, I assume the quantity
traded for each product has the following distribution: 7
Prob(q,= L) = 1-w
Prob(q, = H) = w
Prob(qb= L) = 1 -w
Prob(qb = M) = w
where L < M < H and:
M< L
H > )L.
7For simplicity I assume demand for the two goods is the same in the low condition. However, this
assumption could be relaxed and the prices for the good that does not have uncontractible quality would
need to be adjusted for it.
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I assume demand for the goods is perfectly correlated, although any sufficiently strong
positive correlation would be enough for the results to hold.
Proposition 2. When w is small enough, a more efficient relational contract is possible
when premium payments are made on the non-customizable good (the basic good) than when
they are made on the good with uncontractible quality. A premium on the non-customizable
good is also more efficient than a fixed premium payment.
Proof:
When w becomes small enough, the retailer's constraint (3) converges to:
-/ 66
(Pu - Pu) (qt,u + L)+ (P, - P) (qt,b - L ) Le(L).
The supplier's constraint (6) converges to:
6-6 6(P - P ±) qt, + L) + (Pb - P ±qt, - L ) q,/E[e(q)] 2 + 3L[e(L)]2.
Because the probability of low demand L approaches 1, any contract that achieves optimal
effort at times of low demand will dominate a contract that does not. Therefore, I will explore
contracts such that both of these conditions hold:
" optimal effort occurs in times of low demand
" the contract does not break down in times of high demand.
The first property implies that e(L) = 1. Substituting this term into the supplier's
constraint, we see that in order for the supplier to maintain optimal effort in times of low
demand requires:
S[L + 6 L] < [Pu - Pu + Pb - P] [L + L] (9)4p. 1-61-
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This implies - < P - P. + P - Pb.
We also need to ensure that the retailer is willing to make the required premium payment
in times of high demand, which requires:
(Pu- )H + L) + (P- P) (M +  L) L - (10)(PU-1-6 1-6 1- 2#
Consider a contract that places a premium only on the good with uncontractible quality.
By the assumption that H > +L, the inequality in (10) implies that P -Pu < 1. However,
this implies that the supplier's constraint (9) cannot be satisfied.
Intuitively, because the good with uncontractible quality has such large demand spikes,
the contract has to limit the premium payment on this good to prevent the retailer from
deviating in times of high demand. However, this constraint on the price premium will be so
low that the supplier does not have enough incentives for optimal effort in times of normal
(low) demand.
By contrast, by the assumption that M < 16L, the simple, non-customizable good
(good b) does not face this problem. Setting P - P = , the retailer's constraint (10) still
holds in times of high demand, and the seller has incentives for optimal effort in times of
low demand because (9) holds.
Finally, a premium on the non-customizable good is superior to a fixed premium payment.
Because demand for this good is correlated with demand for the good with uncontractible
quality, the supplier has stronger incentives for effort when demand for the uncontractible
quality good is high. Although it is not possible to sustain optimal effort in times of high
demand, this additional premium payment makes it possible to sustain greater effort than
would be possible with a fixed premium payment. QED
I now present a numerical example in which optimal effort is not sustainable, and in
which a relational contract with a premium payment on the simple, non-customizable good
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is more efficient than one with a premium payment on the good with uncontractible quality.
Assume the distribution of qt,, is given by: P[qt,, = 5] = 0.9 and P[qt,2 = 50] = 0.1.
Let 6 = 2. This implies that (--) E[qt,u] = 2(9.5) = 19. Because max[qt,u] > 19, optimal
effort is not sustainable. Intuitively, this good has a distribution that occasionally has such
large spikes in the quantity traded (due to either exogenous supply or demand shocks) that
the cost of optimal effort in these periods exceeds the value of the ongoing relationship, so
a relational contract cannot be used to sustain optimal effort.
However, there is a "near optimal" relational contract that is sustainable using a premium
payment on the simple, non-customizable good, under the assumption that quantity of the
two goods is perfectly correlated but the distribution of good b is less volatile.
Let the distribution be P[qt,b = 5] = 0.9 and P[qt,b = 18] = 0.1.8 Consider the following
relational contract: Pu - P, = 0, Pb - P = -, eu(qt,u = 5) = -, and eu(qt,u = 50)
() ). This contract calls for zero premium payment on the customizable good but
positive premium payment on the non-customizable good. It also calls for optimal effort
when demand is low and 2 optimal effort when demand is high. By substituting these values
into the constraints for the retailer and the supplier, it can be seen that each firm always
wants to stay in this contract, both in periods of low and high demand.
Intuitively, setting a price premium on the more stable, non-customized good provides
stronger incentives to the supplier in times of high demand without letting the total premium
payment grow so large that the retailer would want to exit the relationship.
This same contract is not sustainable if the same premium payment is placed on the good
with uncontractible quality because the premiums become more than the retailer is willing
to pay during the large spikes in quantity traded of this good.




The analysis uses a novel dataset from a supplier of Asian food products to restaurants in the
Southeast United States. The supplier is a mid-size supplier who has multiple competitors
in the area. The sales agents work with a few restaurants throughout the entire period that
the restaurant is a client but there are instances in which the agents will take over someone
else's account.9
The sales agents take orders from clients and negotiate prices. Restaurants' order fre-
quency varies from once a day to a few times a week. The sales agents encourage the
restaurants to try new goods and explain how items can be used if the items are new. The
agents have some latitude over the prices they can negotiate with the restaurants. In this
industry, discounts are not used very much, but the agents are known to give either small dis-
counts for bulk orders or other small discounts. The most frequent type of discount given is
a 2% discount that sales force awards periodically to their customers. This discount is a sig-
nificant one for a typical sushi (or similar) restaurant. The National Restaurant Association
claims that restaurant margins are between 4 and 6% before taxes.10
The dataset contains invoice level data on prices, products details and quantities. I
supplement this information with characteristics for the restaurant who orders the products.
I used Urbanspoon.com and yelp.com to find average menu prices for the restaurants. The
menu prices are in four categories: "Under $10", "$10 to $15", "$15 to $25", and "Over $25".
The restaurants which had no menu price available online (either from customer reviews or
from the restaurant) were excluded from the analysis. The price levels are used as a proxy
for the restaurants type: High End restaurants will generally be considered those with prices
over $10.
9In the dataset, there are a few instances when a switch happened because an agent resigned and some
other similarly random events. It is very rare for a salesperson to be taken off an account for performance
problems.10www.restaurant. org
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Table 1: Sales Agent Orders Percent By Item Perishability
Dry Fresh Frozen Other
Agent 1 18 40 36 6
Agent 2 26 23 45 7
Agent 3 25 22 47 6
House 21 24 48 7
Overall 22 28 43 6
The dataset spans 49 weeks 1 and several states: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and South
Carolina. The goods are either from domestic sources, or imported from China, Japan,
Scotland, and Vietnam. There are around 600 unique product codes being transacted, with
178 Dry goods such as Rice, 33 Fresh goods such as Big Eye Tuna, 305 Frozen items such as
Smoked Shrimp and 83 Other items like Chopsticks. The Dry, Fresh and Frozen products
represent 22%, 28%, and 3% of the transactions respectively.
Table 1 reports the percent distribution of goods (overall times ordered) for each agent,
by type of good.
The dataset contains specific notes about the restaurants' requests for customization of
the products. The customizable products correspond to goods with uncontractible quality
from the theoretical model. While not all products can be customized, there are certain
products (such a fresh fish) that are amenable to customization. I classify these products
based on the requests available in the dataset: if a product code is ever associated with a
request for specific service, then I include it in the set of products that can be potentially
customized. This classification does not imply that the product will always be customized or
that all restaurants ask for special dimensions of the product. Table 2 shows the distribution
of unique product codes that can be customized with the distribution of the customizable
products for overall number of orders (with intuitive ordering weights).
The restaurant supply industry is affected by supply shocks due to uncertainty about
"Data span April 2010 to February 2011.
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Table 2: Customizable Items
Product name % of Total Orders % of Customized Orders
Frozen Scottish Whole Salmon 9.09 27.64
Y/F Tuna Loin 3.68 11.20
Fluke(Hirame) 2.64 8.03
Farm Rock 2.53 7.69
Fz. Escolar Block 2.20 6.70
California Uni 1.83 5.56
Fz. Smoked Salmon Chunk 1.81 5.51
Frozen Hamachi Fillet 1.66 5.06
(Frozen) Scottish Salmon Fillet for Sushi 0.85 2.60
Big Eye Tuna Loin 0.78 2.38
Fz Hamachi Loin Farm Japan 0.55 1.69
Asi Beff Gyoza 0.51 1.55
Mushidako Octopus 0.49 1.48
Fresh Hamachi Fillet(Japan) 0.43 1.30
Aji 0.43 1.29
Fz. Albacore Tuna Loin 0.42 1.28
Fz. Escolar Block 0.41 1.25
Live Mirugai(Geoduck) 0.41 1.23
Madai (Japan) 0.29 0.87
Fresh Kanpachi Fillet 0.24 0.73
Unagi 0.24 0.72
Spanish Mackeral (USA) 0.23 0.69
OO-Toro Southern Blufin 0.22 0.68
Atlantic Whole Salmon (Farm Raised) 0.21 0.62
Tuna Ground 0.20 0.61
Apex Y/F Tuna Saku AAA 0.14 0.43
Blue Fin 0-Toro 0.13 0.40
YF Tuna Loin 0.10 0.29
Bluefin Tuna Loin 0.08 0.25
BE Super Frozen Tuna Saku 0.03 0.10
Y.F. Tuna Loin 0.02 0.07
Chillian Sea Bass 0.02 0.06
BF Frozen O-Toro(Saku) 0.01 0.03
Awabi (Abalone) 0.00 0.01
YF Super Frozen Tuna Saku 0.00 0.01
Overall Customized 32.87 100.00
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raw, fresh materials available at any time. Uncertain seafood catch affects the quantity of
items being transacted: if there is historically volatile supply of a particular type of fish, the
restaurants may include it only in a few menu items or keep a list of special dishes when
that particular fish is in season. However, to a certain degree, most fresh goods are volatile
in terms of supply: weather patterns or demands in other countries12 may affect availability
for restaurants. For the empirical analysis, having a volatile transacted quantity for raw
products influences how the restaurants pay for customization of these products. The model
suggests that volatile items cannot sustain relational contracts that will provide adequate
levels of quality so the payments for customization will be made in the context of a bundle
of goods and will be tied to more stable goods.
5 Analysis
5.1 Main Effect
Table 3 shows that the supplier charges higher prices to high-end restaurants. I consider that
a High End Restaurant is one whose menu prices are over $10. These are the restaurants who
customize the products most, and thus would be willing to pay more for the customization. I
estimate a simple OLS specification with fixed effects for each product code, and perform the
estimation with the negotiated transaction prices. Table 3 includes robustness checkes for
several other specifications. The coefficient for High End restaurants is positive, indicating
that higher end restaurants pay more for their inputs on average. In fact, further analysis
shows that demand volatility and customization are moderating factors for the payment
premiums.
1 2For example, the sushi industry in the US is currently suffering from a low supply of eel because the
main exporter, China, has recently seen an increase in domestic demand for it.
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Table 3: High End Restaurants with Price Over $10 Pay Higher Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Price Log Price Price Log Price Price Log Price Price Log Price Price Log Price
High End Restaurant 0.703*** 0.0280*** 0.820*** 0.0264*** 0.878*** 0.0366*** 0.528*** 0.0233***
(0.161) (0.00476) (0.166) (0.00484) (0.168) (0.00480) (0.162) (0.00478)
High End Over $15 0.947*** 0.00975***
(0.106) (0.00371)
Item fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Agent Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No No No No No
Observations 44972 44972 44972 44972 44972 44972 42957 42957 43047 43047
R2 0.8862 0.8515 0.8863 0.8516 0.8864 0.8514 0.8880 0.8564 0.8847 0.8506
Models (5) and (6) define High End to be any restaurant over $15. Models (7) and (8) exclude Other products. Models (9) and (10) exclude
restaurants over $25. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the
following system: *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
Table 4: Payment for Customization is Not Tied to the Customized Product if Demand is
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Volatility Volatility Volatility Volatility
Low High Low High Low High Low High
High End Restaurant -2.325*** 1.845*** -2.214*** 1.972*** -2.277*** 2.206*** -0.958 0.716***
(0.424) (0.299) (0.425) (0.306) (0.447) (0.327) (0.630) (0.268)
High End x Customized 2.971*** -0.763** 2.943*** -0.739** 2.924*** -1.124*** 4.312*** 0.103
(0.483) (0.341) (0.481) (0.339) (0.503) (0.365) (0.845) (0.301)
Item fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Agent Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No No No
Observations 15295 29677 15295 29677 14552 28405 3005 41967
R2 0.9207 0.8688 0.9209 0.8690 0.9219 0.8708 0.9504 0.8825
Volatile
Volatility in (1) through (3) is measured by demand for the top customizable products. Model (4) uses volatility of all customizable products.
Model (3) excludes "Other" products. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are
denoted by the following system: *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
5.2 Payments that Sustain Relational Contracts are Not Tied to Volatile Cus-
tomized Services
The High End Restaurants pay higher prices in general to sustain the relational contract that
allows them to receive more service from the supplier. The requests for customization that
I observe in this supplier dataset are detailed notes on fish weight and parts. For example,
a restaurant may ask for the fish to be "Clean and White please" or for a specific size of fish
("15LBS back loin head part please !!!!!"), or even request how frozen the items should be
("BE Super Frozen Tuna Saku -IBag BIGG" or "21b not super frozen"). There is no general
sense that any of these requests are improving the quality of the fish in a vertical sense
(i.e. big tuna is not alway better than baby tuna, and super frozen fish is not always better
than slightly frozen one) but rather the restaurants are requesting customizations based
on their needs for the menu, for the special offerings, or maybe based on some customer
preference for one type of dish over another. Based on these requests, I create a set of
products that are customizable. Not all transactions of these goods are customized, but the
variable "customized" is defined to be 1 if the good is ever customized.
The theoretical model predicts that to sustain the relational contract, payments for cus-
tomization may be tied to non-volatile products. Volatility of the customized product is an
important moderator in the model: the theoretical results predict that for stable demand of
customized products, there is no restriction on placing the extra payment for effort directly
on the price of the customized product. However, if the customized product has volatile
demand, then the model predicts that the payment may not be tied to its price (as these
prices would be too volatile to sustain a relationship and provide adequate effort levels).
Thus, if the customized product is stable, then the payment could be tied to its price, but if
the customized product is volatile, then the payment will not be tied to it.
In the dataset for restaurant supplies, I define a volatility index for each product-
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restaurant pair by computing the standard deviation divided by the mean of the quantity
ordered. Furthermore, at the restaurant level, I separate the restaurants into volatility tiers
based on how volatile their demand for customized goods is." The restaurants with the
most volatile demand for customizable goods are considered "High Volatility" while restau-
rants that have a relatively stable volatility for customizable products are classified as "Low
Volatility". For item i being sold to restaurant r, I estimate the empirical specification:
Priceir, = yHighEnd, x Customizablej + aHighEndr + /Customizablej + ItemGroupi +Eir.
Consistent with the theoretical model, Table 4 shows that the payments that sustain
the relational contracts which assure customization for some products cannot be tied to the
demand of customizable volatile products. Instead, these are linked to the payments of stable
goods.
5.3 More Frequent Orders Make It Possible to Sustain Larger Payments on
Customized Goods
Further analysis of the High End restaurants reveals that not all of these customers need
to pay the premium payments on stable products in order to sustain the relationship with
the supplier. This is not surprising: customers who interact more often with their suppliers
are able to sustain a relationship more easily than those who do not. The theoretical model
predicts that downstream customers who interact frequently with their supplier (those with
high 6 discount factor, who care about the future more) will be able to sustain the relationship
more easily by paying a premium on the items they customize than those who have only
ocasional interactions with the supplier. Intuitively, comparing two high end restaurants
13 The Volatility Tiers are based on which quartile of volatility the restaurant's demand for customized
goods is in: a restaurant who orders a very volatile customized good will be in Volatility Tier 4 while a
restaurant whose customized goods demands are all in the lowest quartile of demand volatility will be in
Volatility Tier 1.
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who care about the relationship, but with one buying only once a week while the other one
makes purchases every day, it becomes evident that the restaurant with the more frequent
interaction will have more to gain from staying in the relationship. Thus, the restaurant
with more frequent interactions will be able to pay some part of the price premium on the
customizable good because the future value of its relationship with the supplier will be higher
than the payment. The same is not true for the restaurant with once-a-week delivery, whose
premium payment on the volatile, customizable good will be lower because the future value
of its relationship is lower. Table 5 shows that restaurants who have more frequent delivery
(and therefore a higher discount factor 6) are able to pay a premium for the customizable
items and sustain the relationship with that premium.
Table 5: High End Restaurants: Relationship Strength is a Moderator
All Stable Volatile All Stable Volatile
Customized x Orders 1.468*** 2.365*** 1.309*** 1.464*** 2.175*** 1.347***
(0.196) (0.366) (0.249) (0.201) (0.358) (0.257)
Customized 4.397*** 2.112*** 5.305*** 4.485*** 2.320*** 5.322***
(0.407) (0.586) (0.586) (0.422) (0.581) (0.604)
Orders -0.974*** -2.825*** -0.782*** -1.148*** -2.504*** -1.109***
(0.191) (0.336) (0.245) (0.190) (0.325) (0.245)
Item fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Agent Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 31753 10331 21422 31753 10331 21422
R2 0.8670 0.9250 0.8411 0.8675 0.9254 0.8417
Volatility is measured by demand for the top customizable products. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system:
*10%, **5%, and ***1%.
I use the numbers of orders per week as a proxy for relationship strength in the specifi-
cation for item i being sold to restaurant r:
Priceir, = -yOrders, x Customizablej + caOrders, + PCustomizablej + ItemGroupi + Eir.
All restaurants order on average at least once a week, with some ordering more often. The
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High End volatile restaurants are able to sustain the relationship by putting the price pre-
mium on the customizable items as their number of orders per week increases. This is con-
sistent with the prediction that a higher 6 will allow stronger relationships to be sustained
despite volatile demand.
6 Conclusion
I develop a model of relational contracts to explain why high end downstream firms pay
higher prices on the goods they purchase. I assume that these firms require a higher level
of personalization for some of the items they purchase and that the added services are
not ex-ante contractible through a formal contract. I prove that the payments that can
sustain a relationship are linked to goods with stable demands, even if these goods are
not customizable. Moreover, the relational contract provides uncontractible services for the
customizable goods.
Empirically, I show that High End restaurants pay more on the products they purchase
and make more requests for customization. Thus, I infer that the higher prices paid by High
End restaurants are made to compensate and incentivize the supplier for providing the added
services the restaurants require. If the customizable goods have volatile demands, then the
payments sustaining the relational contract are based on goods with stable demand which
cannot be customized.
I believe the findings of the empirical application show that the theoretical model of
relational contracts is plausible and used in practice. More generally, I find that relational
contracts are a useful tool to ensure appropriate levels of uncontractible quality to players
that value this added quality dimension.
There are several limitations to my study. I do not explicitly model customer demand
and retail prices, which could lead to double marginalization. Futher research is needed to
determine if relational contracts can have a role in coordinating the channel to solve the
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problem of double marginalization. It would also be interesting to extend the model to
include multiple competing retailers who need relational contracts.
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Essay 2:
Third Party Marketing Approvals*
Abstract
When customers purchase new products, there is often a degree of uncertainty about
their quality. A common solution is to rely on a third-party certifier to provide some
form of accreditation that signals quality. However, the incentives of a third-party
certifier may not be completely benign. Competitive certification markets may lead
the certifiers to provide unduly positive evaluations of quality to gain market share or
provide unduly negative evaluations in order to gain credibility with end-users. Based
on competition models of certifier markets, this paper analyzes the consequences of
allowing non-governmental parties to enter into the certification market for medical
devices. We exploit an unusual natural experiment to evaluate the extent to which
third-parties can be relied upon to correctly report product quality. We focus on
the FDA's decision to allow third parties to prepare certifications for certain medical
devices, and observe how this decision to introduce competition at the reviewer stage
has affected the quality of products allowed to go to market. We find evidence that
allowing third party certification leads to significantly lower product quality. However,
we find that experience with using a third party reviewer in the past diminishes the
negative effect of reviewer competition.
*1 am especially indebted to my advisor, Catherine Tucker for comments, guidance and encouragement.
Helpful comments were provided by seminar participants at MIT.
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1 Introduction
When customers purchase new products there is a always a degree of uncertainty about
their quality. One common option is to rely on a third-party 'certifier' or some form of
accreditation to signal or disclose quality. However, one issue is that the incentives of a
third-party certifier may not be completely benign. The certifiers may have to weight the
benefit from reporting quality truthfully against losing market share to their competitors. We
aim to determine empirically if competition at the certifier level leads to quality distortions
in the end market.
In order for many innovations to be brought to market, they have to demonstrate that
they meet certain quality thresholds. Certification is a review process that allows new
products in the medical, bio and life-sciences to become available to the market. In such
fields, certification is a key step in preparing to develop a product for the market, as years
of work and research rely on proving the quality of the product and how it will benefit
consumers. A common way of achieving this, especially in the fields of medicine, medical
devices and biotechnology is to ensure the product is certified. Usually, in both the US and
Europe this certification process is managed by the government. However, long delays has
led the US to experiment with permitting some devices to be certified by private firms.
This paper analyzes the consequences of allowing competition in the certification market
for medical devices. We exploit the FDA's decision to allow third parties to prepare certi-
fications for certain medical devices and observe how this decision affects the quality of the
new products that are ultimately used in the market. If we find that third party reviews
are as high quality as the government's, this could speed up review processes and make it
easier for new products to reach consumers in need. On the other hand, if we find that third
party reviews are of lower quality, this could suggest that the government needs to continue
playing a key gate-keeper role, and it is the only way for new firms to credibly prove their
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quality.
The market for medical devices is regulated by the FDA, which acts as a testing and
certifying entity before clearing medical devices for marketing approval. Due to the large
number of medical devices and costly process involved in testing these devices, in 1997, the
FDA Modernization Act allowed the FDA to start a program that lets accredited companies
conduct their independent certification process and submit the results for final marketing
approval to the FDA. In doing so, the FDA created a competitive certification market in
which the FDA acts both as a player and as an overseer of the final decision for marketing of
medical devices. The third party review program includes Class I and Class II devices, which
are devices of lowest risk to the patient. On May 20, 1998, FDA issued a list of 147 types of
low-to-intermediate risk devices eligible for third party review.1 After 2001, when the pilot
testing program was expanded, more than 670 types of devices became eligible to be certified
by third parties. While some devices are still low risk, the expanded list includes devices
such as surgical lasers, and medical imaging devices. The test program has proved successful
in relieving some of the financial burden of the FDA, but concerns about the quality of the
certification process have emerged at the same time.
On the one hand, third party certifiers have the advantage of short turn-around time
for reviews, and a friendly review process. For example, Intertek, an accredited third party
certifier, introduced in March 2010 a 10-day reviewing program and advertised "smoothest
possible 510(k)submissions for its clients".2 This program would allow the company produc-
ing the medical device to get to the market in 50 days instead of the 90 days necessary for
FDA-led processing. The companies who develop the products can ask for certain tests to
continue while others are still pending and can generally control the timeline of the certifi-





cation process, something that they are not able in a FDA-lead certification investigation.
On the other hand, it is unknown if the quality of the third-party reviews actually gets
checked by the FDA after these are submitted. Reputation effects should take care of simple
mistakes, but examples of final FDA approvals for third party reports that mirror exactly
language used by the company in the original submission lead to concerns over how thorough
the overseeing process really is. 3
Despite an abundance of data collected by the FDA, there are no large scale analyses
of the quality of the medical devices that received non-governmental forms of pre-market
reviews. Most of the existing reports and analyses focus on the financial benefits of relieving
the FDA of the certification reviews. Some reports analyze the number of third party
prepared reviews to point to the test program as a success, as it has enabled more medical
devices to be marketed in a shorter time.
We intend to fill the gap by looking at the outcomes of a natural experiment for the
quality of the medical devices approved. Our work has direct regulatory impact: the test
program is under question at the moment, following a few very public and tragic failures
of radiology devices.4 In the long term, established companies can rely on their reputation
to weather spells of bad products. Thus, accurate certificate results benefit new companies,
who have to prove that their products are high quality. For entrepreneurs, an unbiased and
efficient certification market leads to easier entry and a fair chance at success. However,
as competition among the certifiers increases, the quality of the reviews is affected by the
incentive to be truthful and the drive to gain market share. Our work will quantify the result
of these conflicting effects.
Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 presents the regulatory context of mar-
keting medical devices. Section 4 describes the datasets used in this paper. Section 5 shows
3WSJ.com, Third-party reviews of devices come under scrutiny at the FDA, March 15, 2010
4NY Times Articles Series: Radiation Boom
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the empirical results of our analysis. Section 6 proposes a mechanism that could explain the
results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
As far as we know, this is the first paper to test empirically the effects of allowing competition
at the certifying stage for a product on the ultimate quality of the product. It is related to a
growing stream of theoretical work on standards, forum shopping and certification markets.
Previous theoretical work in markets with information asymetries has analyzed the strate-
gic behavior of certification intermediaries. Lizzeri (1999) considers markets in which certi-
fiers are dependent on sellers for payment and are able to extract the full premium of pro-
viding information to the buyer market. In this model, quality is determined exogenously
and the certifier's role is to provide a signal about quality to the buyer. He also shows that
perfect competition at the intermediate stage of certification will lead to full disclosure and
no profits for the certifiers, as the intermediaries compete the information rents away. In
subsequent work, Albano and Lizzeri (2001) allow quality to be endogenous and analyze the
certifier's strategic response: the intermediary's presence ensures that quality is non-zero
but also manages to extract rent for providing quality information so the manufacturer has
incentives to provide less than optimal quality because it does not reap the full benefits of
providing optimal quality. This paper does not include certifier competition, which is an
important part of the empirical results on the current paper.
Competition at the certifier level and its effects on incentive to disclose accurate infor-
mation is modeled in Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003). They find that in the presence of
price competition for reviewer services, there is an information externality which leads to
an equilibrium in which certifiers rely on other's services and compete on low prices, thus
generating low quality reviews. Unlike the present paper, Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003)
does not consider the effects of certifier reputation on their incentives, but rather focuses on
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a central planner intervention of setting minimum prices to achieve a second-best equilibrium
of optimal quality disclosure.
Recent work on forum shopping and certifier competition (Lerner and Tirole 2006; Farhi
et al. 2011) analyzes the case of competition at the third party certifyer stage and allows
manufacturers to choose among different certifiers. This stream of research focuses on the
tension between needing to be credible to the end-user market (and reputation concerns)
with catering to the sellers of the product who pay for certification. Lerner and Tirole
(2006) allow certifiers to differentiate in how friendly they are to the sellers and allow sellers
to shop around strategically for the most suitable certifier. This is similar to the medical
devices market, where the product sponsor has a choice of firms to use for eligible products.
Farhi et al. (2011) focuss on tiered certification and transparency. For medical devices, the
transparency level is set: if a review is not successful at the third party stage, it will not
become public, which may lead manufacturers to shop around for the certifier who will give
them a positive rating, even if it is not founded in true quality level. This model implies that
competition at the certifier stage, followed by a rubber-stamp process at the FDA approval
stage, might theoretically lead to lower quality products for the end user. Our estimates
indicate this may be happening in the medical devices certification market. Moreover, Farhi
et al. (2011) find that in markets where certifiers compete with each other over market
share, they will decide to implement a shorter time review as a way to attract sponsors.
Interestingly, we find that this race to yield reviews in a short time characterizes the market
for certifying medical devices. Since review time seems to be a strong selling point for the
certifiers in the Accredited Persons program, it is an indication that the third party reviewers
are competing with each other over market share by decreasing certification time, rather than
through fees.
A separate stream of research related to our paper includes empirical models of financial
ratings or education evaluations. Empirical papers on financial certification of risk like
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(Bolton et al. 2012) focus on multiple ratings for the same product and the incetive to shop
around for seller in a market with both naive and experienced buyers. Becker and Milbourn
(2010) find that the credit market becomes less accurate at certifying quality, and distorts
quality upwards, when the number of certifiers increases. On the other hand, Doherty et al.
(2011) claim that entry in the insurance ratings market leads to different stardards for ratings
between the incumbent and the entrant: the entrant has higher standards for the same quality
insurer and only higher-than-average quality insurers choose to receive a second rating from
the entrant. Unlike these papers, we focus on how a change in certifier competition is
reflected in product quality. In the natural experiment we exploit, the coarseness of the
ratings, the transparency of the process and the standards of review are all determined
before the competition is introduced in the market and we will consider these to be set
throughout the period for our estimation. Instead, we focus on the endogenous quality of
the products that get certified as a result of competition introduced at the certifier stage.
Medical devices are particularly suited for this analysis, as their quality can be objectively
measured by the number of adverse effects they generate.
Unlike education outcomes or financial ratings, whose expectations may influence the ul-
timate quality perception of the product at the consumer end, medical products will function
properly in expectation unless their actual quality is less than what it was certified to be.
Thus, the results from the natural experiment for medical device may be cautiosly extended
to other products that need certification.
This paper is also relevant to a growing stream of research in marketing which analyzes
information asymmetries using differences in differences methods (Busse et al. 2006). The
literature on disclosure of payment or gifts (Dana and Loewenstein 2003; Malmedier and
Schmidt 2011) sheds some light on the tension between maintaining a reputation for truthful
reviews and payment maximization, feelings of reciprocity or fairness. Our paper assumes
that a product cannot be marketed without certification of an appropriate level of quality
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and does not focus on shading the process of reviewing the product or the fees associated
with it. Instead, we focus on competition at the reviewer stage and strategic reviewer's
response to it.
Recent literature has focused on heathcare IT in order to analyze how adoption of new
technology can save lives (Miller and Tucker 2011). Finally, this paper is related to Thiru-
malai and Sinha (2011) which shows the role of learning and how recalls for medical devices
are incorporated into stock prices. Thirumalai and Sinha (2011) does not address the certi-
fication part of marketing medical devices but does analyze the consequences of bad quality
(as reflected in recalls) on stock prices for the manufacturer. They find that stock prices
do not react enough to incorporate the new recall information, which may indicate that the
market does not penalize bad quality enough to deter manufacturers from marketing un-
safe products. However, the authors find evidence of learning, with firms that had previous
recalls being less likely to have future recalls. Our paper includes more granular data on
adverse effects in order to study unsafe products: we look at adverse effects that happens
in a few years after the product is marketed. Moreover, we are interested on whether intro-
ducing competition at the certifier stage makes products less safe, regardless of the financial
outcomes of these adverse effects. We find that certifier competition does not lead to better
product quality in this market.
3 Medical Devices Certification Process
3.1 FDA Approves Medical Devices for Marketing
This section summarizes the history of medical devices and their certification in the US. We
used the FDA website and FDA reports as our main source of information5 to describe the
evolution of the certification process for medical devices as it relates to our analysis.
Medical devices used in the United States are approved for marketing by the Food and
5 http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/default.htm
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Table 1: Device class and Regulatory Controls
Device Class
Class I General Controls With Exemptions
Without Exemptions
Class II General Controls and Special Controls With Exemptions
Without Exemptions
Class III General Controls and Premarket Approval
Drug Administration (FDA). Medical devices range in complexity and use, from the simplest
like tongue depressors to very complex machines like x-rays or lasers. These devices are
classified in three groups (regulatory classes) shown in Table 1 based on the level of control
needed to ensure that the device is safe for use. The classification depends on how the device
will be used which is usually described in the labeling of the product. The classification is
also risk-based, with devices that are riskiest for the patient or the users being classified as
higher class.
Regulatory controls for premarketing submissions and marketing clearing depend on the
class of the device. Some devices, usually Class I devices, do not require a premarketing
approval. However, if a device is not exempt from premarketing approval, then it requires
submission of a 510(k) or PMA application, which the FDA reviews and approves or denies.
We will focus on devices that require a 510(k) approval in order to be marketed.
Most Class I devices do not require a 510(k) submission (they are exempt from pre-
marketing approval though they must comply with other regulatory standards of registra-
tion/listing, production and labeling), though devices without exemptions will require one.
Class II devices without exemptions require a 510k for approval. Almost all of 510(k) eligible
devices are Class II devices. Class III devices typically require a PMA unless the device was
approved before 1976 or is equivalent to a device approved before then (these are known as
preamendament devices). If the device is a preamendament device, then a 510(k) is required.
Our analysis focuses on Class II devices because these are ones that make up the majority
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of third party certification devices.
A 510(k) is a type of premarket submission made to the FDA to prove that the device
is at least as safe and effective as an existing legally marketed device (that is not subject
to a PMA). 6 This is know as showing that the device is substantially equivalent (SE) to an
existing device that is already approved, called a predicate. The device can be marketed only
after being declared to be SE. The FDA claims that SE determination is done in less than 90
days and is based on information given by the submitter of the device. If the FDA determines
that the device is not SE, then the submitter can resubmit another 510(k) with new data,
submit a PMA or try to reclassify the device. In 1997 the FDA started a program to allow
Third Party Review for conduction the primary review of the 510(k). We will describe the
evolution of this program in more detail in Section 3.3. In this paper, we focus on devices
which are elligible for 510(k) approvals because those are the only types of devices that can
be certified by third parties. We will not consider PMA approvals.
There are three types of Premarket Notification 510(k)'s that may be submitted to FDA:
Traditional, Special, and Abbreviated. The Traditional review may be used for any eligible
device. The Special and Abbreviated 510(k) methods were developed under the "New 510(k)
Paradigm" to help streamline the 510(k) review process. The Special review may be used
for a modification to a device that has already been approved through the 510(k) process,
if the modification does not affect the intended use of the device or affect the fundamental
scientific technology of the device. The Special 510(k) allows the manufacturer to declare
6A PMA is a Premarket Approval through which the FDA determines if a Class III device is safe and
effective. Class III devices are riskier than other devices because they "support or sustain human life, are of
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health, or which present a potential, unreasonable
risk of illness or injury". Thus additional checks are needed to approve these devices, and the PMA is the
strictest type of regulatory approval process the FDA uses. It includes technical sections with non-clinical
laboratory studies and clinical investigations. The PMA is held to high standards of scientific research, as
these are meant to approve risky devices, many of which are completely new or have new elements. The
FDA has a goal to review and make a determination on PMA applications under 180 days but even in 2012
the actual time needed for these is longer. The Third Party Program does not apply to PMA applications,
and the FDA is the only authority for these, so we will not use PMA applications in our analysis.
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conformance to design controls without providing the data. Special reviews have a shorter
timeline than Traditional reviews: the FDA aims to review and make a decision on Special
reviews in 30 days. The Abbreviated review is used when: a guidance document exists, a
special control has been established or FDA has recognized a relevant consensus standard.
Very few devices that are eligible for a 510(k) review are Special or Abbreviated. Most
510(k) are Traditional reviews. We will use both Traditional and Special types of devices in
our analysis. We will focus on Traditional reviews because these are the ones that are used
mostly, and that benefit most from third party certification in terms of time savings before
being able to be marketed. However, we also use Special reviews as a falsification group: we
check whether there is an effect of third party certification for this class of devices.
3.2 Reporting Adverse Effects and Malfunctions
The devices are used by hospitals, nursing homes etc and research facilities. These are
required to report malfunctions of the device, but reporting rules vary depending on the
seriousness of the incident. If a death occurs, then user facilities report the event to the
FDA. However, if a serious injury occurs, then the rules state that the report needs to be
done only to the manufacturer. If the manufacturer is unknown, then the facility makes the
report to the FDA. In addition, the user facilities submit a semi-annual report to the FDA
containg a short list of all the adverse reports they made during that period. This report
standard for user facilities is known as the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, which started
being enforced in November 1991. In 1998, the Food and Drug Administration Modernization
Act (FDAMA) made a few changes to the reporting rules, including an annual report of to
the FDA summarizing all adverse event reports hospitals filed during that year (instead of
the previous semi-annual reports).
In addition to user facilities, there are other parties that are required to file adverse event
reports: distributor and manufacturer. Voluntary submitters are also allowed to report
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adverse events. All these types of reports are compiled by the FDA and made available
to the public on the FDA website. We use all types of reports in our analysis. However,
because a single event may be reported by several agents (for example, in a manufacturer
report, a user facility report and a voluntary report), we aggregate the reports and use only
one instance for each single event. The process of matching the reports to a device is quite
difficult, and we tried to keep the most amount of information about the report and the
device involved, regardless of the source of the report (for example, if the year of the event
was missing in one version of the report but not the device type, then we combined the two
reports into a complete one and used it for our analysis).
3.3 Third Party Certification for Medical Devices
In 1997, the FDA implemented FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), which included
the Accredited Persons Program. This program was based on a pilot run previous by the
FDA in which other organizations were allowed to prepare the certification reviews for 510(k)
applications. The short pilot ended and was replaced with a longer, more permanent test
program in which third parties were allowed to become accredited persons to participate
in the certification of 510(k) applications. The accredited person's program allowed third
parties to certify eligible devices only, by preparing the review for the 510(k) and then
submitting it, along with its recommendation, for direct approval to the FDA. The law also
specifies that the FDA must then make a decision on the review in 30 days, which is quite
short compared to the usual 90 days required for a direct submission to the FDA.
The Accredited Persons Program also specifies the process through which a company can
become accredited for preparing 510(k).
The program does not make it mandatory for all manufacturers of eligible devices to
use Accredited Persons: manufacturers can submit 510(k) applications through the regular
process to the FDA as well. Thus, comparing failure rates of devices certified by third parties
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to FDA devices could lead to biased results because of selection effects at the manufacturer
level. Section 5 describes in detail how we control for selection effects.
There are no additional fees for reviews submitted by Accredited Persons, but third
parties are free to negociate and set their own fees with the manufacturer as there is no
FDA guidance about those fees. The.FDA charges a small fee for reviews that use FDA
certification: in 2012 the standard fee is $4,049 (small businesses with less than $100 million
in gross receipts or sales have a reduced fee of $2,024).
The FDMA was initially quite restrictive in specifying eligible devices. In 2001, the FDA
launched an Expansion Pilot, which allowed Accredited persons to review many more Class
II devices that they could previously. Broadly, many Class II devices that had no device-
specific guidance documents became eligible for Third Party Review in 2001. This created
a natural experiment for competition at the certifier stage. Table2 lists the changes in FDA
policies over time. We exploit this fortunate law change in our analysis: we use the eligibility
for the pilot program, the post policy period and the third party eligibility to study whether
introducing competition among certifiers leads to products of different quality levels than
those certified by the FDA absent the policy change.
510(k) reviews are meant to show that a device is safe, effective and equivalent to an
existing and already approved device (predicate). The Third Party Review is supposed
to be similar in quality to an FDA review. The FDA receives two copies of the review,
along with additional information, review documentation and recommendation from the
third party reviewer. The third party thus takes over the role of performing the time-
consuming primary review of the product and the FDA is meant to get an accurate review
without actually performing it. The FDA, after reviewing the report, can either approve
(clear the device for marketing) or request additional information. The third party then
passes along the request for information to the device sponsor, who can then provide it or
explain why it thinks it is not needed. If additional information is requested, the 510(k) is
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Table 2: Change in FDA Policies over time (Source: www.fda.gov)
Date Policy Change
August 1996 The third-party review pilot program began with just 15
device types eligible
November 1997 The President signed FDAMA into law. The number of
Eligible Devices is 154 (GAO)
September 1998 FDA publishes list of Accredited Persons eligible for the
FDAMA.
November 1998 The agency began accepting 510(k) reviews from Accred-
ited Persons, and terminated the Third Party Review Pi-
lot Program that began on August 1, 1996.
March 2001 Devices otherwise eligible for third-party review, but for
which a specific guidance document does not exist, are
designated as Expansion Pilot devices. For these prod-
ucts, the third party is required to contact FDA prior
to initiating its review, to discuss specific areas that the
reviewer should address. This contact is not required be-
fore a third party reviews subsequent submissions for the
same product category. (GAO: FDA expanded the pro-
gram to include more than 670 class I and class II device
types to be eligible for 510(k) review by a third party)
October 2003 FDA increased review fee from $2187 to $3480 ($2784
for small businesses). Third-party submissions remain
exempt from the fee.
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placed under a 30-day hold (this is true even if the primary review is done by the FDA).
For devices using third party reviews, after information is provided, these devices are still
considered on the fast timeline of a third party review, which can mean significant time
savings for the manufacturer.
In addition to being on a fast-track to approval once it reaches the FDA, the third party
certification process has other benefits for the sponsors. The accredited firms claim to have a
friendlier process, with the manufacturer having input and feedback into the review process.
This is very different from a traditional FDA review where there is no feedback until the
end of the process. In addition, third party certifiers attract manufacturers (and compete
with each other) on the time it takes to prepare a review. For example, in 2010 Intertek
launched a "10-Day 510(k) Review Program - Real-Time Review" for the primary review
and submission to the FDA. They claimed that the service will considerably shorten the
time to market and raise the probability of a successful application on a first pass. This is
indeed a significant time saving for the sponsor: the device will take 40 total days to get be
marketed compared to the usual 90 days that would be needed if the manufacturer used the
FDA for the primary review. 7
The companies approved by the FDA as Accredited Persons have specialized expertise
in some area of device testing, standards, or foreign regulatory requirements which may help
the sponsors during the primary review process, as there is more information sharing and
collaboration that would usually occur in a FDA-led primary review.
There are 10 companies approved as Accredited Organizations list in Table 3 (most
current list as of 2012). These are approved for different types of devices: not all devices
may be reviewed by all companies. The third party companies are located in the US and
internationally, which may also be a consideration for foreign manufacturers and importers.
'http://www.intertek.com/news/2010/03-25-10-day-510k-review-program
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Table 3: Third Parties: Accredited Organizations 8
Name Location
British Standards Institution United Kingdom
Center for Measurement Standards, ITRI Republic Of China (Taiwan)
Dekra Certification B.V. Netherlands
Intertek Testing Services USA
NIOM Scand. Inst. of Dental Materials Norway
Pharmalink Technical Group, LLC USA
Regulatory Technology Services, LLC USA
TUV Rheinland of North America, Inc. USA
TUV SUD America, Inc. USA
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. USA
4 Data On Medical Device Certification and Post-Approval Per-
formance
4.1 FDA Databases are used for analysis
We use two separate databases that span 12 years to perform an in-depth analysis of the
third party certification program and its results.
" The PreMarket Notifications (510(k)) Database records what medical devices were
certified and whether or not they were certified by the government or a private party,
along with other specification about the device and the manufacturer.
" The MAUDE Database records all instances of adverse medical events connected with
the use of a medical device. These reports are either voluntary reports, user facility
reports, distributor reports, and manufacturer reports, spanning a large universe of
details and seriousness of the averge events.
We restrict the analysis to devices that need 510(k) approvals in ordered to be marketed. We
use a differences-in-differences approach to analyze whether the introduction of the program
allowing non-governmental pre-market approval of medical devices has changed the overall
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quality of the products in this market.
4.2 Which products choose third party review
Third party review is available for a list of eligible devices. However, not all devices eligible
benefit in the same way from choosing a third party review over a standard FDA review. In
particular, products that are more complex or expensive, and for which potential sales are
higher will benefit more from going to the market earlier. Additionally, there are types of
products for which FDA review times are especially long, depending on which FDA branch
reviews these products.
Not all eligible devices benefit from third party certification. Mass-produced simple
devices usually do not have enough sales to recouperate the third party fee, in which case
the manufacturer is more likely to submit an FDA review, for which fees are lower. Moreover,
devices eligible for Special 510(k) submissions are guaranteed a 30-day response from the
FDA, which negates most of the time saving from using third parties. We use these Special
submission as a control group, since we do not expect them to benefit from third party
certification.
Table 4 shows the percent of products eligible for Third Party Review before the Pilot
Program while Table 5 shows the percent of products eligible after the introduction of the
Pilot Program. It seems that it takes time for the manufacturers to start taking advantage
of the new eligible categories of products, so there is a slow start to the number of products
that are actually reviewed by Third Parties in 2001 and 2002. In effect, we will use 2003
as the year when implementation of the pilot becomes widespread in the certification stage.
Thus our difference-in-difference estimation will focus on changes in product quality before
and after 2003, which we take to be exogenous and the source of our exogenous variation.
Table 6 shows the summary statistics for the period 1997 to 2005, which is used in the
main analysis. We focuse on five years of adverse effects after each device is marketed. Thus,
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Table 4: Proportion of Third Party Reviews for products already eligible before Pilot Pro-
gram
Year FDA Review Third Party Review Total
1996 100.00 0.00 100.00
1997 99.07 0.93 100.00
1998 99.18 0.82 100.00
1999 97.46 2.54 100.00
2000 96.70 3.30 100.00
2001 93.07 6.93 100.00
2002 93.80 6.20 100.00
2003 89.70 10.30 100.00
2004 85.36 14.64 100.00
2005 85.91 14.09 100.00
2006 84.89 15.11 100.00
2007 83.99 16.01 100.00
2008 79.04 20.96 100.00
2009 83.09 16.91 100.00
2010 87.89 12.11 100.00
Total 91.71 8.29 100.00
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Table 5: Proportion of Third Party Reviews for products eligible in the Pilot Program
Year FDA Review Third Party Review Total
1996 100.00 0.00 100.00
1997 100.00 0.00 100.00
1998 100.00 0.00 100.00
1999 100.00 0.00 100.00
2000 100.00 0.00 100.00
2001 98.76 1.24 100.00
2002 97.90 2.10 100.00
2003 95.23 4.77 100.00
2004 93.27 6.73 100.00
2005 91.54 8.46 100.00
2006 91.85 8.15 100.00
2007 91.81 8.19 100.00
2008 90.80 9.20 100.00
2009 91.48 8.52 100.00
2010 94.55 5.45 100.00
Total 96.17 3.83 100.00
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Table 6: Summary Statistics: Devices from 1998 to 2005
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Observations
Adverse Events 0.17 0.71 0 5 17200
Indicator 0.07 0.26 0 1 17200
Third Party Review 0.05 0.21 0 1 17200
Post Policy 0.37 0.48 0 1 17200
Eligible for Pilot 0.29 0.45 0 1 17200
Average Time By Committee 108.65 17.15 76 318 17200
Table 7: Differences in Differences: Adverse Events for 1998 to 2005
FDA Review Third Party
Difference Mean Mean T-Test
Adverse Effects Before Pilot -.0105 .1925 .2029 -0.2282
Adverse Effects After Pilot .04595 .1335 .0875 1.5827
devices approved starting in 2006 would have fewer adverse effects as a result of having fewer
years of observation in the dataset. 9
As some initial evidence of the effect of the policy implemented in the Pilot program,
Table 7 indicates that there is a decrease in the incidence of adverse effects for both FDA
reviews and Third Party reviews after the policy change; furthermore, this decrease is larger
for third party reviews than for FDA reviews. This result seems promising, but we worry
about selection into the pilot program: even though some devices are eligible for it, it may
be that the manufacturer decides not to send the devices to a third party.
Table 8 shows the differences between devices not elligible for the pilot program and those
in the pilot, before and after the policy is implemented. The incidence or adverse effects
decreases for both groups, but the decrease is smaller for products eligible for the pilot
program. Although the incidence differences between devices in the pilot program and those
not in the pilot program are not statistically significant for these aggregate numbers, the
fact that those eligible for the pilot show less improvement might suggests the pilot program
9The results of the analysis are robust if instead we limit the adverse events to the first two years of
adverse effects and include devices marketed before 2009.
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Table 8: Differences in Differences: Adverse Events for 1998 to 2005
Not In Pilot In Pilot
Difference Mean Mean T-Test
Adverse Effects Before Pilot .0149 .1971 .1822 0.9473
Adverse Effects After Pilot -.0084 .1272 .1357 -0.4719
is detrimental to the overall safety level of devices that are approved. This comparison is a
very raw estimate, and we pursue the analysis further by including various fixed effects for
each product type in the next section.
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section we deepen the analysis to control for fixed effects for the product categories
and years in the sample. More importantly, we try to see if there is a selection problem with
the devices that manufacturers choose to send to third parties for review.
We use the number of years of adverse effects in the first five years after the device is
approved as the dependent variable for the main empirical analysis. Table 13 shows our main
results. We use the type of approval to restrict the analysis to "Traditional" devices, because
we expect that the effect is strongest for the devices which take a long time to get approved
under FDA review. These devices are classified by the FDA as "Traditional" devices.
As a first start, we look at a simple regression of adverse events on the third party status
of the review shown in Table 9. Model (1) indicates that we cannot attribute the change in
quality to third party reviews, and Model (2) adds approval year and product category fixed
effects. However, these initial results are not enough to conclude that third party reviews
are just as safe as FDA reviews. In particular, it could be that manufacturers could pick and
choose the products to send to the third party review, either because they are trying to game
the system and sneak bad products on the market (if they are picking the bad products)
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Table 9: Raw Effects May Have Selection Bias
(1) (2)
Adv. Events Adv. Events
Third Party Review -0.0209 0.0175
(0.0246) (0.0256)
Approval Year Fixed Effects No Yes
Type of Product Fixed Effects No Yes
Observations 13556 13556
Dependent variable is the number of years with a bad event in the first 5 years after approval for a device category.
or that they trying to get their safest products to the market faster in order to get higher
profits from sales faster (if they are choosing the safest products). In either case, we worry
about selection and want to use the natural experiment given by the expansion of the pilot
program.
Models (1) through (4) in Table 10 show the results of difference-in-difference specification
to determine if products certified by third parties are more or less safe after the pilot program
is introduced compared to the period before the pilot and to other products certified by the
FDA. The introduction of the pilot program created two types of products: devices which
are eligible for the pilot and those that are not. We use the devices that are not eligible for
the pilot as a control group. We compute the "reduced form effect of intention to treat" as
in Angrist and Lavy (2009) as this is the effect that captures the introduction of the pilot
program without being affected by the endogenous selection of manufacturers choosing to use
third party reviews. The policy change can be considered exogenous: the FDA implemented
it because of lack of funds and limited man-power, which is not related to final product
quality outcome. Moreover, while the FDA did choose the products which would be eligible
for the pilot, these are comparable to other Class II products which are not eligible and there
is no sense that the FDA picked safer products to be eligible' 0 .
The analysis is restricted from 1998 to 2008 in order to account for the fact that devices
marketed later than 2008 would have fewer than two years of adverse events reported, which
could skew the results. Pilot Eligible is a dummy variable with 1 for a product that is eligible
10 Note that if that were the case, then our estimates would be biased towards showing that the pilot
produced safer products, which is not the case in our findings.
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to be part of the expansion program. This does not include devices that were alredy eligible
for third party review before the pilot program was implemented. Post Policy is a dummy
variable with value 1 for years after the pilot program became implemented: after 2003 third
parties started reviewing products eligible in the pilot program. For product i which may
be part of the Pilot Program j and was approved in year t (with year 2003 being after the
pilot is implemented), the number of adverse effects reflects:
AdverseEf f ectijt = a+a1PilotEligible j+a2PostPolicyt+/I x Pilotij x PostPolicyt + 0, +rt + Eigt
(1)
Thus, #1 represents the core coefficient we focus on: whether the pilot program (which made
more devices eligible for Third Party certification) had an effect on the adverse effects after
the devices were marketed. Coefficient ai captures the main effect of a device being Pilot
Eligible while coefficient a 2 indicates the effect of the change in Policy as a shift in time. a
is a constant term, while 0 is a vector of product category fixed effects and r represents year
fixed effects.
Tables 10 indicates that third party certification increases the potential bad events after
the device is marketed. Columns (1) through (4) use an indicator dependent variable: it
indicates at least one adverse effect in the two observation years after the device is approved.
Since the dependent variable is a 0-1 indicator, we use a linear probability model in our main
specification. Column (1) indicates the estimates with no fixed effects, column (2) adds year
fixed effects while column (3) product category fixed effects and column (4) adds both year
and product category fixed effects.
Column (1) shows the main specification in Equation (1). It suggests that devices which
are part of Pilot program and are approved after the implementation of the Policy have
a higher rate of adverse events than FDA devices. This is a raw difference and does not
account for specifics about the product or the time of approval. Here, we can imagine
that different products may have different acceptable rates of malfunctions and thus adding
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Table 10: Differences in Differences: At Least One Adverse Event in First Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LPM LPM LPM LPM
Pilot x Post Policy 0.0132** 0.0132** 0.0122** 0.0122**
(0.00530) (0.00530) (0.00529) (0.00529)
Eligible For Pilot -0.00792* -0.00788* -0.0120*** -0.0119***
(0.00417) (0.00417) (0.00413) (0.00413)
Post Policy -0.0226*** -0.0371*** -0.0232*** -0.0387***
(0.00290) (0.00476) (0.00290) (0.00477)
Approval Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Type of Product Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 17782 17782 17782 17782
product category fixed effects is important to control for this counfound. Similarly, there
could be a time trend in our data that could make all products safer or less safe in each
approval year, if there are unrelated quality standards being implemented. Thus we will also
use year of approval fixed effects. Column (2) ads Approval Year fixed effects, column (3)
adds Product Type fixed effects and Column (4) has both types of fixed effects. Together,
these models indicate that the quality of products decreases after the implementation of the
pilot program.
Table 11 checks for robustness of Table 10 to different specifications. Columns (1) through
(5) use the same variable as Table 10: it indicates at least one adverse effect in the two
observation years after the device is approved. Since the dependent variable is a 0-1 indicator,
we use a logit model in our main specification. Column (1) indicates the estimates of a logit
model with no fixed effects, column (2) adds year fixed effects while column (3) adds both
year and product category fixed effects. The data fits a Poisson distribution: the mean and
variance are equal and thus we try to see whether a zero inflated poisson model may be more
appropriate to account for some of the zero observations in adverse effects. Column (4) fits
a zero inflated poisson model with no fixed effects while column (5) adds approval year and
product category fixed effects.
Column (1) suggests that devices which are part of Pilot program and are approved after
the implementation of the Policy have a higher rate of adverse events than FDA devices.
This is a raw difference and does not account for specifics about the product or the time of
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Thble 11: 1998 to 2008: A





Approval Year Fixed Effects




The dependent variable for Models
t Least One Adverse Event in First Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Glm Gim Gim Poisson Poisson
Logit Logit Logit Zero Inf. Zero Inf.
0.530** 0.533** 0.501** 1.059*** 0.901***
(0.215) (0.215) (0.217) (0.299) (0.296)
-0.237* -0.236* -0.415*** -0.409*** -0.430***
(0.131) (0.131) (0.142) (0.143) (0.143)
-0.903*** -2.395*** -2.466*** -0.851*** -2.318***
(0.119) (0.430) (0.431) (0.120) (0.390)
0.649** 0.460*
(0.259) (0.259)
No Yes Yes No Yes
No No Yes Yes Yes
17782 17782 17782 17782 17782
-2170.0 -2139.2 -2001.5 -2355.9 -2326.9
62.98 86.96 256.2 307.4 365.4
(1)-(5) indicates at least one bad event in the observation years.
approval. Column (2) adds Approval Year fixed effects, column (3) adds Product Type fixed
effects as well. Together, these models indicate that the quality of products decreases after
the implementation of the pilot program.
Columns (4) and (5) cosider the possibility that a logistic model may not be the best
discription of our data process. Our dataset has a large number of products which have zero
adverse effects after introduction. This could be because they are similar to other products
but actually safer to use, or it could be that their adverse effects are underreported because
they are not as severe as those for other products. To account for the option of two processes
creating the zero observations, we use a zero-inflated poisson specification. The results are
listed in columns (4) and (5). For the inflation factor, we use a dummy variable which is 1
if the product is in the pilot program after the introduction of the pilot, and zero otherwise.
Column (4) includes year fixed effects while column (5) adds product category fixed effects.
The results in Table 11 suggest that products become less safe for consumers after the
pilot program is implemented. We check the robustness of this finding by using a different
measure of adverse events, by adding several fixed effects and by using a different time frame
for the adverse events. Tables 12 and Table 13 show robustness of the results in Table 11.
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Table 11: 1998 to 2009: A
Table 12: 1998 to 2008: Number of Years with Adverse Effects Two Years After Marketing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Glm Glm Neg. Binomial Glm Neg. Binomial
Neg. Binomial Neg. Binomial Var. from Nbreg Zero Inf.
Pilot x Post Policy 0.539*** 0.513*** 0.569** 0.569** 0.755**
(0.190) (0.192) (0.225) (0.225) (0.300)
Pilot Eligible -0.203* -0.411*** -0.457*** -0.457*** -0.168
(0.116) (0.125) (0.151) (0.151) (0.135)
Post Policy -2.311*** -2.364*** -2.397*** -2.397*** -2.254***
(0.374) (0.375) (0.395) (0.395) (0.391)
inflate
PilotEligible after Policy 0.298
(0.256)
Approval Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product Category Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No
N 17782 17782 17782 17782 17782
Log-likelihood -2606.0 -2431.2 -2342.0 -2342.0 -2458.8
Wald X2 101.9 310.4 379.3 252.5 101.4
Dependent variable is the number of years with a bad event in the first 2 years after approval for a device category.
Table 12 checks for robustness of using a different measure of adverse effects: the depen-
dent variable is the number of years with a malfunction in the first two years a device is
marketed.
Column (1) fits a negative binomial model with approval year fixed effects, with model
(2) adding product fixed effects to that specification. Columns (3) and (4) are equivalent
because model (4) uses the variance from model (3) to fit the GLM specification of a negative
binomial. Column (5) checks whether the estimates change if we fit a Zero Inflated Negative
Binomial model (the data is overdispersed, with the variance almost three times the mean,
which indicates that a negative binomial distribution is more appropriate than a poisson
distribution).
Table 13 checks for robustness of specifying the timeframe of adverse effects: the depen-
dent variable is the number of years with a malfunction in the first five years a device is
marketed. Note that this timeframe for measuring adverse effects implies we can include
fewer devices, those approved between between 1998 and 2005 into our analysis, because any
device approved after 2005 will have fewer than five years when we can observe malfunctions.
Table 13 indicates that third party certification increases the potential bad events after
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the device is marketed. Columns (1) fits a negative binomial model, with models (2) and (3)
adding fixed effects to that specification. Columns (4) and (5) are equivalent because model
(5) uses the variance from model (4) to fit the GLM specification of a negative binomial.
Column (6) uses the GLM model adjusted for Pearson's x 2 . Columns (7) and (8) check
whether the estimates change if we fit a Zero Inflated Negative Binomial model.
Column (1) shows the main specification in Equation (1). It suggests that devices which
are part of Pilot program and are approved after the implementation of the Policy have
a higher rate of adverse events than FDA devices. This is a raw difference and does not
account for specifics about the product or the time of approval. Here, we can imagine
that different products may have different acceptable rates of malfunctions and thus adding
product category fixed effects is important to control for this counfound. Similarly, there
could be a time trend in our data that could make all products safer or less safe in each
approval year, if there are unrelated quality standards being implemented. Thus we will also
use year of approval fixed effects. Column (2) ads Approval Year fixed effects, column (3)
ads Product Type fixed effects and column (4) adds both types of fixed effects. Together,
these models indicate that the quality of products decreases after the implementation of the
pilot program.
Finally, columns (7) and (8) cosider the possibility that a binomial distribution may not
be the best discription of our data process. Our dataset has a large number of products
which have zero adverse effects after introduction. This could be because they are similar
to other products but actually safer to use, or it could be that their adverse effects are
underreported because they are not as severe as those for other products. To account for
the option of two processes creating the zero observations, we use a zero-inflated negative
binomial specification. The results are listed in columns (7) and (8). For the inflation
factor, we use a dummy variable which is 1 if the product is in the pilot program after the
introduction of the pilot, and zero otherwise. Column (8) adds fixed effects to the bare-bones
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Table 13: 1998 to 2005: Number of Years with Adverse Effects Five Years After Marketing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Gim Gim Gim Neg. Bin. GIM Gim Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin.
Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin. Var. Nbreg Var. Nbreg x2 Zero Inf. Zero Inf.
Pilot x Post Policy 0.347* 0.355*** 0.330*** 0.483** 0.483** 0.483** 0.343* * 0.586***
(0.124) (0.124) (0.117) (0.214) (0.214) (0.207) (0.163) (0.177)
Pilot Eligible -0.312*** -0.312*** -0.453*** -0.518*** -0.518*** -0.518*** -0.152* -0.241***
(0.0650) (0.0650) (0.0650) (0.129) (0.129) (0.126) (0.0797) (0.0931)
Post Policy -0.587*** -1.108*** -1.157*** -1.298*** -1.298*** -1.298*** -0.131 -0.796***
(0.0651) (0.125) (0.120) (0.205) (0.205) (0.199) (0.0901) (0.170)
inflate
PilotEligible after Policy 0.505*** 0.639***
(0.148) (0.153)
Approval Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Product Category Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
N 13556 13556 13556 13556 13556 13556 13556 13556
Log-likelihood -5925.7 -5909.0 -6404.1 -4443.4 -4443.4 -4443.4 -4533.9 -4383.8
Wald X2  105.6 127.3 748.1 369.7 300.1 300.1 5.741 306.0
Dependent variable is the number of years with a bad event in the first 5 years after approval for a device category.
Table 14: Differences in Differences Specification for Falsification Group: Special Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LPM LPM LPM LPM
Pilot x Post Policy -0.0444* -0.0415* -0.0395 -0.0358
(0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0241) (0.0241)
Eligible For Pilot 0.0665*** 0.0637*** 0.0580*** 0.0540***
(0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0173) (0.0173)
Post Policy -0.0360*** -0.159*** -0.0342** -0.169***
(0.0136) (0.0385) (0.0135) (0.0382)
Approval Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Type of Product Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 3006 3006 3006 3006
Dependent variable: at least one adverse event in the first 5 years after approval for a device category.
specification in column (7).
5.1 Falsification Tests
We use special 510(k)'s as a control, they are seen in 30 days so the benefit from using third
parties for the primary review is limited. These are devices that are considered by the FDA
to be simpler than the usual Traditional devices, and we expect to find that they are at
least as safe as those Special devices approved by the FDA. This is because with a simple
(and possibly safer device) there is less room for distortions of quality, and we expect that
third parties will be just as good as the FDA in preparing the certification review for these
devices. The specifications are similar to the ones used to Equation (1), except we restrict
the analysis to Special type approvals.
The results in Table 14 indicate indeed that Special devices are marginally safer after the
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pilot is implemented. The result is not significant when using a whether the device had any
adverse effects in the first five years as a dependent variable, indicating that indeed devices
that allow Special reviews are not affected by the pilot program implementation.
6 Mechanism for the Effect of Third Party Certification
In this section we attempt to analyze how third parties affect the process of certification. In
particular, we classify manufacturers by their experience with working with third parties for
the initial review process.
Thus, we construct a dummy variable called "Used Third Party Before" for each manu-
facturer - year of approval group which will be positive if the manufacturer had previously
used a third party and zero otherwise. The interaction of this variable with the effect of
the pilot program indicates that companies which have previously worked with third parties
tend to market safer products. This is an interesting moderator, because it has a few possi-
ble interpretations, but ultimately implies that the third party pilot program can be a safe
alternative to the FDA reviews, after companies start using third parties regularly.
Columns (1) to (3) estimate an GLM model (for a negative binomial family distribution),
and add product category and year fixed effects. Columns (4) and (5) estimate a Zero Inflated
Negative Binomial model.
One possible explanation for the negative interaction term is that competition among
the third parties (which drives the quality down because they are more lax in standards
in order to steal market share from other third party companies) is not actually a problem
once a firm establishes a relationship with a particular company. We interview a director
for regulatory affairs of one of the manufacturers of medical devices. His opinion was that
there is significant habit formation in the industry: companies choose whether to send their
products for review to the FDA or to a third party based on company culture instead of more
strategic reasons. He believed that once a manufacturer started working with a thirdparty
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Table 15: Experience with Third Parties Leads to Safer Products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Glm Glm Glm Neg. Binomial Neg. Binomial
Zero Inf. Zero Inf.
Pilot x Post Policy x UsedThirdParty -1.652*** -1.560*** -1.484** -1.444*** -1.025*
(0.597) (0.598) (0.612) (0.541) (0.584)
Pilot Eligible -0.321*** -0.321*** -0.475*** -0.174** -0.268***
(0.0657) (0.0658) (0.0722) (0.0821) (0.0964)
Post Policy -0.796*** -1.344*** -1.409*** -0.329** -0.979***
(0.0737) (0.131) (0.134) (0.146) (0.225)
Pilot x Post Policy 0.565*** 0.571*** 0.578*** 0.558*** 0.784***
(0.131) (0.131) (0.134) (0.204) (0.215)
Used ThirdParty Before -0.0392 -0.0109 0.327 -0.144 0.0498
(0.192) (0.193) (0.204) (0.207) (0.204)
Pilot x UsedThirdParty 0.514 0.511 0.255 0.943*** 0.739*
(0.438) (0.439) (0.453) (0.314) (0.418)
Post Policy x UsedThirdParty 1.163*** 1.165*** 0.829*** 0.719*** 0.563**
(0.233) (0.234) (0.244) (0.270) (0.256)
inflate
PilotEligible after Policy 0.523*** 0.663***
(0.148) (0.156)
Approval Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes
Product Category Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes
N 13556 13556 13556 13556 13556
Log-likelihood -5893.5 -5875.6 -5437.4 -4526.5 -4376.0
Wald X2  162.0 185.4 718.0 24.08 6560.9
Dependent variable is the number of years with a bad event in the first 5 years after approval for a device category.
and is satisfied with the outcome, that company is likely to send more products to be certified
by the thirdparty.
This story leads us to believe that thirdparties may have an incentive to attract new
customers and be too relaxed in their certification when they acquire the customer, but then
lose that perverse incentive and their certification standards improve. This could be because
manufacturers will be unlikely to switch to another thirdparty after developing a relationship
with one company they like already.
However, this is not the only possible explanation for the negative interaction term.
Another interpretation is that once a manufacturer starts working with a third party
reviewer, they have more insight into how the review process goes and learn how to improve
future products. These improvements could be in the form of a more conservative usage label
or more tests to determine safety. This interpretation is supported by anecdotal evidence
that the third party review process is much more open than the FDA process. In addition to
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the claims third parties make on their websites in order to promote their services, the FDA
itself lists a friendly process with open communication as one of the benefits of the third
party program.
We cannot distinguish between these two alternative explanations, and there may be
more ways to interpret the effect. However, on a larger scale, this effect indicates that the
pilot program is not as damaging as it would seem at first look. At this time, few companies
actually participate in the pilot program, despite the benefits they could get from getting
their products to the market faster. This means that a lot of them are working with third
parties for the first time in our data but will likely continue using third party reviews for
future products. The effect of this experience with third party reviews should imply that
future products will be less biased towards bad quality. It may be that the pilot program
will actually yield unbiased reviews once manufacturers work with third parties regularly.
This is an empirical question that could be answered in the future.
7 Implications
This paper is a step towards understanding whether third party certification programs affect
the quality of the certified products in the end market. We draw on a growing theoretical
literature on certification and try to characterize the pull between two conflicting effects: the
need to provide safe products for reputation concerns and the desire to gain market share
in the certifier market. We use a natural experiment based on the FDA's decision to allow
third party firms to prepare certification reviews for certain types of medical devices.
The findings from the analyses above suggest that the introduction of the pilot program
lead to a drop in the safety of devices being marketed. This suggests that reputation concerns
may be secondary to the desire to acquire market share in this context. However, the results
also indicate that manufacturers who use a third party reviewer tend to have safer products in
the future. This may mean that as manufacturers start to work with a particular third party
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reviewer, there is a lock-in effect that mitigates the certifier's need to fight for market share
and allows the certifier to truthfully review the product. An alternative explanation could
be that manufacturers learn from the experience of working with third party certifiers and
use this knowledge to produce better products subsequently. Future research can investigate
which one of these alternatives is a better explanation for the effect we find in this market.
Further research could also use the intensity of the adverse effects, for example, comparing
recalls to innocuous malfunctions, to see whether there are differences at the product level
depending of the type of certification the products go through before they are marketed. This
could be important because previous research about medical devices (Thirumalai and Sinha
2011) has found that recalls are not punished enough by the capital market. Since recalls
tend to be very expensive in other categories of products, Thirumalai and Sinha (2011) find
an puzzling problem and it would be interesting to see whether the certification mechanism
in this market could be a factor into the lack capital market penalties.
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and the Quasi-Endowment Effect of
Installment Payments*
Abstract
The paper explores the quasi-endowment effect. We evaluate how much consumers
are willing to prepay for a purchase which will be experienced in the future. In par-
ticular, our results indicate that prepaid installment plans allow the consumer to start
deriving utility for the purchase from the moment of the first payment. This quasi-
endowment effect is felt only for goods that are purchased for own consumption.
*I am especially indebted to Drazen Prelec for comments and support. Helpful comments were provided
by Nathan Fong and Catherine Tucker and seminar participants at MIT.
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1 Introduction
A person who decides to buy a home goes through a long and sometimes tedious process of
research. Once he finds a suitable candidate and places the offer for the house, the potential
buyer starts to experience dread over having the offer rejected and "losing the house". This
is inexplicable from the point of view of rational theory: if the offer is rejected, the customer
should move on and put in an appropriate offer on the second-favorite house. Even accounting
for sunk research costs, which should not count in theory, but do affect consumers, it should
be that the same research process has yielded a ranking of favorite houses and not being
able to get the top choice because the selling price is too high should not matter as long
as some house in the ranking is still a match with the price the consumer is willing to pay.
Nevertheless, consumers feel true agony over losing the house they wanted to bid on, and in
some cases, increase their bids over what their true willingness to pay, just to be able to buy
the house. The struggle to "let go" of a bid that reflects true willingness to pay or increase
the bid makes for great reality tv 1 but is baffling from a rational point of view, unless the
customer has already felt ownership of the product that he will not ultimately be able to
purchase.
Earlier literature implies that firms can dupe naive consumers into developing feelings of
endowment. We show that far from being naive, consumers anticipate the endowment effect,
and are actually willing to pay for it.
Previous papers (Heyman et al. 2004) that establish and use the term "quasi-endowment
effect" see it as an irrational manifestation of attachment that cannot be foreseen by the
customer. In particular, the effect is what causes "snipping bidding" towards the end of
an online auction by forcing the customer holding the winning bid to increase his bid more
than his true willingness to pay just as a response to the fear of "losing" the auction. In our
'See "Property Virgins"
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extended version of the definition of quasi-endowment, the customer is aware, on some level,
that he is deriving utility from the quasi-endowment effect. As such, we are able to show
that customers can increase their willingness to pay in order to get the quasi-endowment
utility, even in cases where they are not actually feeling the effect. Lab experiments allow
us to quantify how much a consumer is willing to pay ahead of time for quasi-endowment.
We use anticipated willingness to pay as a proxy for how much the consumer is aware of the
effect he will be experiencing.
We explore the possibility that customers get attached to objects from the moment they
decide to purchase them and even more so when they make a first downpayment or monetary
commitment to purchasing the objects. Quasi-endowment, in this paper, is an extension of
the endowment effect. We define the effect broadly: it refers to a sense of ownership that
consumers develop for a product, despite the fact that they are not owners or users of that
product. This quasi-endowment thus explains the sense of loss that some home buyers feel
when their bid is rejected or the deal falls through. The object that inspires the effect need
not be as valuable as a house: the decision to buy a book online can also cause the quasi-
endowment effect, from the moment the book is placed in the cart. In fact, it is intuitive
that consumers feel this effect even more after having paid for the book, even though the
physical object is still not available for use.
There is a large literature showing that people quickly become attached to goods they
have only briefly owned, or not even started to own yet. This earlier literature has focused
on what happens after people are already endowed with a good. In contrast, we show that
people are not naive about these effects, and are actually able to anticipate them and willing
to pay for them.
An important consideration for installment schemes or layaway plans is the time dis-
counted value of the payments. In that respect, our paper relates to research on time
discounting. Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) show that customers prefer to prepay for luxury
75
or pleasurable items but would want to defer payment and spread it out over the the con-
sumption period for utilitarians items. Our results indicate that customers anticipate the
quasi-endowment effect and are willing to pay for it across categories of products, including
utilitarian ones.
Layaway plans have become popular recently for all types of products, and are being
promoted as the easy and frugal way to make purchases while being on a budget. Considering
stores have layaway fees and there is the cost of no interest, layaway plans are actually not
a way to save money. However, they are a way to control spending impulses, and thus could
be used as a self control mechanism. We do not attempt to prove that quasi-endowment
is not related to self-control. Moreover, we don't restrict our analysis to layaway plans.
Our results show that the subjects may be using layaway as a way to get to experience the
pleasure of quasi-endowment, while we can't rule out that they are also benefiting from the
added discipline of making a simple plan to save or of having a mental account for each item
they put on layaway (see Thaler (1999)).
Mental accounting may be especially important in the face of low budget constraints. Our
research thus relates to a stream of literature on low income households and their behavior.
Layaway in itself is associated, wrongly or not, with low status goods, as Prelec and Simester
(2001) find when they look at what the introduction of an installment payment plan signals
to the customer base of a catalogue retailer for luxury items. We do not look into the
signaling aspect of installment plans.
Our analysis uses a pool of subjects that is more diverse than just lower income house-
holds, so we anticipate that our results are not limited to a certain demographic group. Thus,
unlike Mullainathan and Shafir (2009), we do not anticipate that our findings are limited to
low income households or that the effects we find stem from low budget constraints.
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2 The Experiments
We use three experiments to test the quasi-endowment effect and find its boundaries.
Experiment 1
The experiment was done in the MIT lab, on a computer, as a package of other marketing
experiments that reveal customer preferences. There is no deception, and customers are
encouraged to leave comments at the end of the battery of tests. We collect response time,
IQ measures, and have access to demographic information for the subjects. The survey
places participants in 3 conditions: installment plan with 2 payments, cash at the end of the
period, credit card at the end of the period. They are asked to imagine they are purchasing
a product for themselves in a month and state how much they are willing to pay for .it.
Reference prices are provided and the products are from diverse categories (used in previous
papers: washer and drier, Lego set, camera, vacation cruise etc).
Respondents
A total of 96 respondents were part of the experiment. We drop responses from 4 participants
who seem to ignore the questions and give nonsensical answers. The remaining sample is
well balanced, as the assignment is random across conditions. There are 46 males and 45
females and 1 subject who did not answer the gender query. Additional statistics about the
sample of subjects are presented in tables A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-4 in Appendix A. Subjects
received compensation for their time in the lab, as this experiment was part of a battery of
other tests.
Design and Procedure
The experiment elicited willingness to pay from subjects in 3 conditions: cash, installment
payment and credit card. The items were selected because they have been used in previous
literature and reference prices were realistic at the time of the experiment. Subject did not
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have access to the Internet to check prices, but we found that providing reference prices made
our estimates conservative. In general, reference prices act as anchors: subjects who see a
reference price will state their willingness to pay around that reference price. Thus, providing
reference prices can make a weak effect dissapear and the size of any effect that is still
significant in the presence of reference prices is conservative. We chose to include reference
prices in order to give our subjects some information about the quality and availability of the
items they were seeing, without burdening them with specific information about the product.
For example, digital cameras vary in price from $50 to $1500, and their price also depends on
the store where they are purchased. However, telling participants "Kodak Easyshare M863
Camera (Sells for $119.99 at store CircuitCity )" is completely informative yet quick and
easy.
The subjects were seated in front of a computer screen and started by doing unrelated
marketing tests. At some point in the sequence of experiments, they read the following if
they were in the Credit Card condition:
0 "Imagine that, one month from now, you are planning to purchase a Product from the
list below for yourself. You will pay for this product using your credit card at the time
you receive the product. The store you plan to purchase from accepts all major credit
cards."
or if they were in the Cash condition:
0 "Imagine that, one month from now, you are planning to purchase a Product from the
list below for yourself. You will pay for this product using cash at the time you receive
the product. "
or if they were in the Installment condition:
0 "Imagine that, one month from now, you are planning to purchase a Product from the
list below for yourself. You will pre-pay for this product using 2 cash installments.
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The first installment is to be paid tomorrow and the last one at the time you receive
the product, a month from now. The product becomes yours when you make the first
payment but you can take it home only after you have finished paying for it. "
They were then presented with a list of items (held constant across conditions) and
asked to name the total price they would be willing to pay. Additionally, in the installment
condition, there was space for them to write in two installments. To minimize the danger
that faulty adition influence our results, we also provided them with a space to first name
the total price and it was this total number that is used in all the analysis.
Results and Discussion
The results indicate that subject anticipate the quasi-endowment effect for most items pur-
chased in installments. Notably, the effect is not valid for the Amazon gift card, which is
consistent with previous research. Since a gift card (especially for amazon, with its wide vari-
ety of merchandise) is a money equivalent, we do not expect subjects to feel quasi-endowment
for it. The results show that subjects who pay in cash or by credit card value the gift card
just as much as those whose split the payment into installments.
It is interesting to note that the Wii system is also only marginally more desirable in the
installment condition: at the time of the experiment, the Wii was still in limited supply and
we believe that the participants did not anticipate being able to purchase one for any price,
so their willingness to pay reflects the price of the Wii but not necessarily their willingness
to pay for it.
Overall, the subjects were willing to pay more than an overall premium of $62.33 (signif-
icant at 5% level) if allowed to pay in installments right away. The result indicates not only
that the subjects anticipate the pleasure of feeling quasi-ownership for these items, but that
they are willing to pay at least 20% of the total price in order to secure this pleasure.
Interestingly, we do not find any difference between the cash payments and the credit
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Table 1: Installment and Cash Payment
Washer/Drier Ipod Nano Wii Lego Set Kodak Camera Cruise Amazon Card Pen
Installment 129.6*** 25.84** 20.41 4.652** 13.24* 239.3** 1.352 48.68**
Premium (2.67) (2.44) (1.38) (2.25) (1.85) (2.39) (0.58) (2.23)
Cash 704.7 144.0 183.6 21.17 91.30 1254.1 44.06 131.5
(21.91) (20.73) (18.56) (15.41) (19.69) (19.12) (28.49) (9.15)
Observations 57 56 58 52 57 56 55 53
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** P < 0.01
Table 2: Credit Card and Cash Payment
Washer/Drier Ipod Nano Wii Lego Set Kodak Camera Cruise Amazon Card Pen
Credit Card 2.889 7.250 3.093 -0.887 2.848 145.1 1.686 -18.91
Difference (0.06) (0.72) (0.24) (-0.43) (0.44) (1.57) (0.62) (-0.94)
Cash 704.7 144.0 183.6 21.17 91.30 1254.1 44.06 131.5
(18.86) (20.13) (19.92) (14.74) (19.75) (19.21) (22.85) (9.13)
Observations 65 64 64 57 66 64 63 62
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
card payments. Both are supposed to happen in a 1 time payment a month from when
the experiment takes place, and there is no difference between reported willingness to pay
across these conditions. This result is consistent to results from Prelec and Simester (2001)
who find that subjects are willing to pay more when using a credit card, but that they are
unaware of these tendencies.
Experiment 2
Study 1 was performed in the laboratory and was free from unwanted outside influences, but
has the downside of not being incentive compatible. Experiment 2 is an incentive compatible
field experiment for a small sample size.
Respondents
The experiment is a second price auction for a pair of Red Sox tickets. The 43 Mba students
of a summer class in MIT Sloan submitted bids. Those who did not win the auction were
not compensated. However, those who won the auction were allowed to purchase the tickets
at face value (around $100).
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Design and Procedure
The experiment was a second price auction for a pair of sold out Red Sox tickets. The
students received bid sheets with an identifier to annonimize the participants and instructions
about how the auction would unfold. The bid sheets were split in two payment conditions
and randomized:
" payment in full when the winner received the tickets a week later after the auction
" payment of 10% of the winning bid at the time of the auction and the rest when they
received the tickets a week after the auction
Results and Discussion
The quasi-endowment effect should make the students who pay the 10% downpayment willing
to pay higher prices for the tickets. Indeed, we find that the mean for the Cash condition
is $101 while for the Installment condition it is $134, a 33% increase (significant at 6%,
significance based on log transformation of prices). For the median, the difference is even
higher: $40 compared to $100.
We repeated the same experiment with a separate group of students the following week,
but the results are not conclusive because there were some students who looked up the prices
of the tickets. In the face of an outside option, the results of the auction were closely related
to the actual market value of the tickets and not to the private valuation of each participant.2
2The means for the Cash and Installment conditions were $104 and $109 respectively and the medians
were $110 and $90, while the face value for the tickets was $100.
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Experiment 3
This experiment tests whether all purchases can bring about the quasi-endowment effect.
In particular, we test whether items purchased as gifts have the same property as items
purchased for the self. If the quasi-endowment exists for gifts, then we can generalize that
all purchases are anticipated and that subjects are willing to pay more if they anticipate
purchasing anything. However, if gifts are not associated with quasi-endowment, then we
identify a stronger variant of the effect: subjects anticipate the quasi-endowment only when
they are the ones who will ultimately directly benefit from the purchase.
Respondents
The 84 respondents were participants in the MIT lab in a battery of marketing tests. They
were presented with a similar questionnaire to Study 1, with slight variations in the instruc-
tions. Subjects who had participated in the earlier experiments were not allowed to be part
of this experiment.
Design and Procedure
The subjects were seated in front of a computer screen and started by doing unrelated
marketing tests. At some point in the sequence of experiments, they read the following if
they were in the Credit Card condition:
0 "Imagine that, one month from now, you are planning to purchase a Product from
the list below as a gift for a family member. You will pay for this product using your
credit card at the time you receive the product. The store you plan to purchase from
accepts all major credit cards. Please write the price you are willing to pay for each
product in the list."
or if they were in the Cash condition:
0 "Imagine that, one month from now, you are planning to purchase a Product from the
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list below as a gift for a family member. You will pay for this product using cash at
the time you receive the product. "
or if they were in the Installment condition:
0 "Imagine that, one month from now, you are planning to purchase a Product from the
list below as a gift for a family member. You will pre-pay for this product using 2 cash
installments. The first installment is to be paid tomorrow and the last one at the time
you receive the product, a month from now. The product becomes yours when you
make the first payment but you can take it home only after you have finished paying
for it. "
The manipulation as a gift for a family member ensures that the subjects consider these
items to be desirable, but are not planning to use them themselves.
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Table 3: Installment Premium vs Cash Payment For Gifts
Washer/Drier Ipod Nano Wii Lego Set Kodak Camera Cruise Amazon Card Pen
Installment 94.28* 17.34 9.071 -0.683 3.905 -3.507 -0.259 30.70
Premium (1.68) (1.59) (0.82) (-0.17) (0.49) (-0.04) (-0.19) (1.33)
Cash 715.5 148.5 200.3 26.93 100.8 1439.1 47.91 128.7
(21.08) (23.42) (30.63) (11.62) (21.34) (27.21) (60.45) (9.07)
Observations 52 50 49 46 51 50 49 45
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Results and Discussion
The analysis reveals gifts do not seem to cause the quasi-endowment effect. We cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the total of the installment payments is the same as the willingness
to pay in cash.
We further check whether the null effect of the quasi-endowment for gifts is caused by
a difference in our samples, or whether there is some systematic difference in valuations of
the items for gifts as opposed to the same items if purchased for self. Table B-2 compares
the Cash condition across Study 1 and Study 3, while table B-3 compares the studies in the
Installment condition. We find no significant difference in how much the items are valued.
Pooling the data from Study 1 and Study 3 indicates that the quasi-endowment effect is
marginally significant still, though not for all the items included in the study. Tables B-4 and
B-5 show that for gifts for others and items purchased for personal use, the quasi-endowment
has the expected sign.
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3 Conclusion and Implications
We have showed that the quasi-endowment effect is a powerful force in driving payment
decisions and increasing willingness to pay for consumers. We have shown that consumers
are not naive about the quasi-endowment effect, they anticipate the feelings of ownership
that will occur, and are actually willing to pay for the pleasure that comes from this feeling
of ownership. Moreover, we have analyzed how robust the effect is in a variety of situations,
and quantified how its size may differ based on several factors. As far as we know, this is the
first paper to explore and measure the quasi-endowment effect in an experimental setting.
However, there is evidence that merchants and retailers are aware of the existence of the
effect and are using it to improve their profits (and arguably to create happier consumers).
The quasi-endowment effect is intuitively used by retailers, both in brick and mortar
store and in online settings. The helpful sales assistant who takes away your apparel items
and sets up a cabin to try them on is not only freeing your hands to shop for more items,
but also reserving the current items for you and allowing you to enjoy the quasi-endowment
pleasure of these items. Shopping baskets in stores where the average purchase is a few items
are meant to encourage larger purchases, but also to make sure the consumer feels that what
is in the basket is valuable and it's his. Online merchants have developed shopping carts
that will save items in between browsing sessions, to increase the chances of a purchase by
lower repeat search costs, but also to remind the consumer that these items are his and it
would painful to delete them. In the opposite direction, some retailers allow consumers to
"steal" each other's shopping cart items, to create a sense of frenzy and increase bidding on
items.3
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Table A-1: Experiment 1: Payment Condition and Gender Summary
Male 0 1 Total
Credit Card 45.45 54.55 100.00
Cash 42.42 57.58 100.00
Installments 64.00 36.00 100.00
Total 49.45 50.55 100.00
Note that 1 observation is missing.
Table A-2: Experiment 1: Payment Condition and Income Levels Summary
Income Level 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Credit Card 62.50 12.50 9.38 0.00 15.63 100.00
Cash 57.58 18.18 12.12 3.03 9.09 100.00
Installments 57.69 7.69 7.69 11.54 15.38 100.00
Total 59.34 13.19 9.89 4.40 13.19 100.00
Note that 1 observation is missing.
Table A-3: Experiment 1: Payment Condition and Education Summary
Education Level 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Credit Card 0.00 6.06 27.27 24.24 42.42 100.00
Cash 3.03 9.09 27.27 36.36 24.24 100.00
Installments 0.00 12.00 24.00 32.00 32.00 100.00
Total 1.10 8.79 26.37 30.77 32.97 100.00
Note that 1 observation is missing.
Table A-4: Experiment 1: Payment Condition and Employment Summary
Employment 1 2 3 4 Total
Credit Card 15.15 12.12 54.55 18.18 100.00
Cash 18.18 15.15 39.39 27.27 100.00
Installments 19.23 7.69 53.85 19.23 100.00
Total 17.39 11.96 48.91 21.74 100.00
Table A-5: Experiment 3: Payment Condition and Gender Summary
Male 0 1 Total
Credit Card 56.67 43.33 100.00
Cash 54.55 45.45 100.00
Installments 52.63 47.37 100.00
Total 54.88 45.12 100.00
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Table A-6: Experiment 3: Payment Condition and Income Levels Summary
Income Level 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Credit Card 41.38 20.69 13.79 6.90 17.24 100.00
Cash 65.63 12.50 9.38 3.13 9.38 100.00
Installments 55.56 27.78 5.56 0.00 11.11 100.00
Total 54.43 18.99 10.13 3.80 12.66 100.00
Table A-7: Experiment 3: Payment Condition and Education Summary
Education Level 2 3 4 5 Total
Credit Card 3.33 36.67 23.33 36.67 100.00
Cash 12.12 24.24 27.27 36.36 100.00
Installments 5.00 25.00 25.00 45.00 100.00
Total 7.23 28.92 25.30 38.55 100.00
Table A-8: Experiment 3: Payment Condition and Employment Summary
Employment 1 2 3 4 Total
Credit Card 26.67 6.67 50.00 16.67 100.00
Cash 15.15 15.15 45.45 24.24 100.00
Installments 15.79 5.26 57.89 21.05 100.00
Total 19.51 9.76 50.00 20.73 100.00
Table B-1: Credit Cards and Cash Payment for Gifts
Washer/Drier Ipod Nano Wii Lego Set Kodak Camera Cruise Amazon Card Pen
Credit Card 37.05 0.337 0.127 -4.554 -6.197 -110.9 -0.906 -4.801
Difference (0.64) (0.03) (0.01) (-1.41) (-0.83) (-1.18) (-0.64) (-0.22)
Cash 715.5 148.5 200.3 26.93 100.8 1439.1 47.91 128.7
(18.33) (20.50) (24.30) (11.88) (19.65) (22.63) (48.56) (8.73)
Observations 61 61 59 59 62 59 62 51
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B-2: Cash Payment For Gifts vs Self: Comparison of Means across Studies
Washer/Drier Ipod Nano Wii Lego Set Kodak Camera Cruise Amazon Card Pen
Self -10.77 -4.453 -16.66 -5.760* -9.515 -185.0** -3.842** 2.818
(-0.20) (-0.45) (-1.59) (-1.80) (-1.41) (-2.11) (-2.17) (0.14)
Gift 715.5 148.5 200.3 26.93 100.8 1439.1 47.91 128.7
(19.02) (21.58) (27.12) (12.04) (21.06) (23.25) (38.50) (8.76)
Observations 65 65 64 59 66 64 63 58
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B-3: Installment Payments For Gifts vs Self: Comparison of Means across Studies
Washer/Drier Ipod Nano Wii Lego Set Kodak Camera Cruise Amazon Card Pen
Self Difference 24.58 4.049 -5.316 -0.424 -0.182 57.78 -2.230 20.81
(0.59) (0.36) (-0.30) (-0.22) (-0.02) (0.58) (-1.02) (0.85)
Gift 809.7 165.8 209.4 26.25 104.7 1435.6 47.65 159.4
(25.92) (19.35) (15.24) (17.96) (17.20) (18.95) (28.51) (8.64)
Observations 44 41 43 39 42 42 41 40
t statistics in parentheses
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B-4: Installment Premium vs Cash Payment For All Purchase Types
Washer/Drier Ipod Nano Wii Lego Set Kodak Camera Cruise Amazon Card Pen
Installment 113.6*** 21.90*** 14.18 1.898 8.558 122.0* 0.326 41.20**
Premium (3.12) (2.92) (1.49) (0.89) (1.61) (1.79) (0.23) (2.62)
Cash 710.2 146.3 192.0 24.10 96.06 1346.6 46.02 130.2
(30.67) (31.31) (31.83) (17.86) (29.03) (31.30) (51.37) (12.95)
Observations 109 106 107 98 108 106 104 98
t statistics in parentheses
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B-5: Credit Cards and Cash Payment For All Purchase Types
Washer/Drier Ipod Nano Wii Lego Set Kodak Camera Cruise Amazon Card Pen
Credit Card 18.04 3.841 1.030 -2.751 -1.690 20.11 0.339 -12.83
Difference (0.47) (0.53) (0.11) (-1.41) (-0.34) (0.30) (0.22) (-0.87)
Cash 710.2 146.3 192.0 24.10 96.06 1346.6 46.02 130.2
(26.44) (28.95) (30.86) (17.59) (27.88) (29.21) (42.33) (12.72)
Observations 126 125 123 116 128 123 125 113
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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